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A MATCH MADE IN MARYLAND: HOWARD CHASANOW AND
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
ALAN D. HORNSTEIN* & NICHOLE G. MAZADE*
I. INTRODUCTION
From time to time, a particular judge will distinguish himself or
herself in a specific area of law to the extent that he or she will be-
come identified with that area and recognized for contributions to it.1
So it is with Judge Howard Chasanow and the law of evidence.
Judge Chasanow's view of the impact that the Federal Rules of
Evidence had and should have had on the development of Maryland
evidence law was the subject of an earlier article in the Maryland Law
Review.' Such an examination necessarily proceeds from a legislative
perspective; that is, the concern is with the extent to which the new
Maryland Rules of Evidence should mirror their federal counterparts.
In this Article, we explore Judge Chasanow's contributions to Mary-
land evidence law from the more familiar common law perspective of
a judge called upon to resolve specific problems by interpreting the
new Rules or by resorting to preexisting evidentiary principles. Per-
haps not surprisingly, the views of Judge Chasanow as "legislator" are
not entirely harmonious with his views as judge.
First, we describe the two opposing theories on the extent to
which formal rules of evidence constrain the further development of
common law principles, and we note a distinct characteristic of the
Maryland Rules that allows common law evidence principles to con-
tinue to take shape. We also discuss Chasanow's interpretive ap-
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. B.A., M.A., Long Island
University; J.D., Rutgers University; M.A., St. John's College.
** Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Baltimore, Maryland. B.A., Elon College; J.D., with hon-
ors, University of Maryland.
1. Examples include Robert Bork in antitrust law, see, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The
Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36
WAYNE L. REv. 1413, 1416 (1990) (describing Bork as "the nation's leading conservative
antitrust scholar"); Justices Black and Douglas in First Amendment law, see, e.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Recent Books on the First Amendment, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 729, 734 (1982) (book review)
("First amendment law has taken its shape from Justices like Holmes, Brandeis, Black, and
Douglas."); and Judge Richard Posner in law and economics, see, e.g., Gary Minda, One
Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND.
L. REv. 353, 373 (1995) (describing Judge Posner as "the founding father of the conserva-
tive legal movement known as the law and economics movement").
2. Alan D. Hornstein, in Tribute to Judge Howard Chasanow, 59 MD. L. REv. 711 (2000).
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proach, which reflects a tendency to give deference to the codified
Rules while at the same time continuing to develop common law doc-
trines not specifically addressed by those Rules. In addition, we review
a selection of Chasanow's decisions in six areas of evidence law, and,
in the process, highlight three traits that characterize Chasanow's rul-
ings on the law of evidence in Maryland: his continued development
of common law evidence principles both before and after the adop-
tion of the Maryland Rules, his superior analytic precision, and his
somewhat inconsistent view on the extent to which the Maryland
Rules should mirror their federal counterparts.
II. THE MARYLAND RuLEs OF EVIDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW
The scholarly literature on the Federal Rules of Evidence is riven
by a fundamental disagreement about the relationship between the
Rules, the common law of evidence that preexisted them, and the ex-
tent of the constraint imposed by the Rules on the power of the courts
to continue to develop the law of evidence.' On the one hand, there
are those like Professor Imwinkelried, who hold that the Federal Rules
of Evidence constitute a statute that should be treated like any other
statute.4 Courts have the power to construe, using the traditional
tools and theories of statutory interpretation. The Supreme Court,
according to Professor Imwinkelried, has employed a "moderate tex-
tualist approach" to construing the Federal Rules.5
In contrast, other scholars hold that the Federal Rules should be
read to constrain courts to a far lesser degree.6 According to Profes-
sor Weissenberger, for example, the Rules should be thought of less as
3. Compare, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Evidence Myopia: The Failure to See the Federal Rules
of Evidence as a Codification of the Common Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1539 (1999), with
EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence Should Be Conceived as a Perpetual
Index Code: Blindness Is Worse Than Myopia, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1595 (1999).
4. Professor Imwinkelried explains that "[t]he Federal Rules [of Evidence] sweep
away many uncodified limitations on the introduction of logically relevant evidence and
disable the appellate courts from enforcing categorical exclusionary rules that cannot be
grounded in the statutory text of the Rules." Imwinkelried, supra note 3, at 1612.
5. Id. at 1596. For other views on the Court's approach to construing the Federal
Rules, see Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1541 n.7 (listing numerous law review articles
that discuss the Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence).
6. See, e.g., Glen Weissenberger, Are the Federal Rules of Evidence a Statute?, 55 OHIo ST.
L.J. 393, 393 (1994) (describing the Federal Rules as a "skeletal structure of a richly com-
plex evidentiary system"); id. at 402 (stating that the Federal Rules are not intended to
discontinue the judiciary's "time-honored role in interpreting and expanding evidentiary
doctrines"); Glen Weissenberger, The Supreme Court and the Interpretation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307 (1992) (attacking the Supreme Court's reliance on ca-
nons of statutory construction, such as the plain-meaning doctrine and the doctrine of
legislative intent, in construing the judicially-created Federal Rules of Evidence).
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a typical statute and more as an "index code" of the common law,
preserving common law doctrines not included in the text of the
Rules and permitting continuing common law development of the law
of evidence. 7 Under this "perpetual index model,"8 a code is a "'clari-
fying aid rather than a final statement"' and serves to facilitate the
further growth of evidence law.9 As Weissenberger explains:
[T]he rules in the Federal Rules of Evidence should not be
construed by attempting to discern their intended underly-
ing meaning. Rather, they must be interpreted in the con-
text of the fluid common-law doctrines that the Rules
represent....
. . . [T]he law must be permitted to grow, and this
growth inevitably occurs within the judicial branch on a case-
by-case basis.
The foregoing analysis should not be construed as an
argument that federal courts have unbridled discretion to
disregard the text of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Courts
did not have limitless discretion to disregard the federal
common law of evidence prior to the adoption of the Rules.
On a case-specific basis, however, a court is justified in de-
parting from the literal text of a rule of evidence when fair-
ness, growth, and justifiable efficiency require it."°
Thus, Weissenberger concludes, the recent scholarly debate that fo-
cuses on the appropriate balance between text and extrinsic sources
in interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence" "faces a fate of unsat-
7. See Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1556-67.
8. Id. at 1562. Weissenberger quotes Joseph Story's description of the perpetual in-
dex model: "a 'perpetual index to the known law, gradually refining, enlarging and qualify-
ing its doctrines, and, at the same time, bringing them together in a concise and positive
form for public use.'" Id. at 1559 (quoting JOSEPH STORY ET AL., CODIFICATION OF THE
COMMON LAw 46 (New York, John Polhemus 1882)).
9. Id. at 1559-60 (quoting Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?-
Recent American Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent
Development, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 1119, 1132).
10. Id. at 1580, 1582 (footnotes omitted).
11. See, e.g., EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Moving Beyond "Top Down" Grand Theories of Statu-
tory Construction: A "Bottom Up" Interpretive Approach to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 OR. L.
REv. 389, 412-25 (1996) (advocating the adoption of a "bottom up" theory of interpreta-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence that gives heightened emphasis to text); Eileen A.
Scallen, Interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence: The Use and Abuse of the Advisory Committee
Notes, 28 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1283 (1995) (advocating a partial reliance on the advisory com-
mittee's notes, stating that they are a unique and highly reliable type of legislative history
to be referred to when analysis of the text of a Rule fails to solve an evidentiary problem);
Andrew Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Call for a Politically
Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 329, 353-99 (1995) (rejecting a textualist inter-
317
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
isfactory conclusions from the start because it proceeds from the
wrong-minded premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence are a
statute." 
12
The textual support for Professor Weissenberger's approach1 3 is
found in Federal Rule 102, which provides:
These Rules shall be construed to secure fairness in adminis-
tration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and
promotion of growth and development of the law of evi-
dence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined. 4
On its face, Maryland Rule 5-102, providing guidance for the in-
terpretation of the Rules of Evidence, substantively mirrors its federal
counterpart. Rule 5-102 provides:
The rules in this Title shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay,
and promote the growth and development of the law of evi-
dence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and pro-
ceedings justly determined.15
Yet there is an important difference between the Federal Rule
and the Maryland Rule. It is a difference that went unremarked by
Judge Chasanow's partial dissent to the order adopting the Maryland
Rules of Evidence,16 perhaps because it is at least partially "hidden"
from one consulting Title 5. Following Rule 5-102, there is a cross-
reference to Rule 1-201. The latter provides, in pertinent part:
"Neither these rules nor omissions from these rules supersede com-
mon law or statute unless inconsistent with these rules."17 Thus, the
Maryland Rule differs from its federal analog by explicitly retaining
those portions of the preexisting common law of Maryland that are
not inconsistent with the new Rules.
On the question of the appropriate approach to the Rules, Judge
Chasanow's explicit orientation would ally him more closely with the
pretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence and advocating a more flexible "politically real-
istic hermeneutics").
12. Weissenberger, supra note 3, at 1545.
13. In support of this approach, Professor Weissenberger offers historical and separa-
tion-of-powers arguments, as well as the textualist argument suggested above. See id. at
1546-55.
14. FED. R. EVID. 102.
15. MD. R. 5-102.
16. See Amendments to Maryland Rules of Procedure; Adoption of New Tide 5, Rules
of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXIX (1993) (Chasanow, J., partial dissent) [hereinafter Chasa-
now's Rules Dissent].
17. MD. R. 1-201(c).
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Imwinkelreid camp than with Weissenberger. Yet he leaves some "wig-
gle room": "In construing a rule [of evidence], we apply principles of
interpretation similar to those used to construe a statute."18 In prac-
tice, however, Judge Chasanow looks to the language of the codified
Rules and to the advisory committee's notes in interpreting the
Rules,'" but his decisions also indicate that he is willing to recognize
the viability of common law doctrines not explicitly codified in the
Maryland Rules of Evidence, and he has incorporated common law
tests into several of the codified Rules. 20
This difference in interpretive approach is not unimportant. For
example, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,21 the Supreme
Court determined that the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702
superseded what had been the prevailing common law standard for
the admissibility of scientific evidence, general acceptance in the rele-
vant scientific community22 -the so-called Frye test.23 The Frye test
had been adopted in Maryland in Reed v. State.24 Although the advi-
18. State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79, 702 A.2d 723, 728 (1997) (emphasis added). Judge
Chasanow applied a plain-meaning analysis to the language of Maryland Rule 803(b) (2)-
the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule-noting, however, that "[t]he ultimate
goal of [the court] is 'to give the rule a reasonable interpretation in tune with logic and
common sense.'" Id. at 80, 702 A.2d at 728 (quoting In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646
A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994)).
19. See, e.g., id. at 80-81, 702 A.2d at 729 (consulting the advisory committee's notes to
Federal Rule 803(2) for guidance in applying Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (2)).
20. See, e.g., Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 541-46, 693 A.2d 781, 788-91 (1997) (discus-
sing the common law doctrines of "verbal completeness," "opening the door," and "cura-
tive admissibility"); see also infra notes 103-150 and accompanying text (discussing Conyers
and Chasanow's analysis of these three doctrines).
21. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
22. 1& at 589 & n.6.
23. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (finding that "while
courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs"). The general acceptance in the relevant scientific community requirement set
forth in Fye was abandoned in Daubert in favor of a standard based on reliability and rele-
vance. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-92. In the absence of any mention of a general accept-
ance requirement in the text of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the Court listed "general
acceptance" as one factor of several to be considered in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence. Id at 594. Other relevant considerations mentioned by the court in-
cluded: testability of the theory or technique, whether the theory or technique has been
subject to peer review, the error rate of the scientific technique, and whether that tech-
nique is governed by well maintained standards. Id at 593-94.
24. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). Faced with divided authority in the scientific
community, the Reed court examined judicial opinions and legal and scientific commenta-
ries on the subject of "voiceprint" analysis. See id. at 395-98, 391 A.2d at 375-76. The court
concluded that voiceprint techniques were not yet generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity and therefore were inadmissible under Fye. Id. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 377.
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sory committee's note to Rule 5-702 suggests neither approval nor dis-
approval of Frye-Reed,25 in the absence of Maryland Rule 1-201,26 one
might have expected the Court of Appeals to follow the Supreme
Court's lead in Daubert, especially because Daubert preceded the adop-
tion of Title 5.27 Indications, however, are that Frye-Reed survives the
adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence.
28
III. CHAsANow's DECISIONS IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
Chasanow's decisions in the law of evidence provide insight into
three characteristics of the judge: his continued efforts to develop the
common law of evidence after the adoption of the Maryland Rules, his
analytic precision, and his occasional inconsistency concerning the ex-
tent to which the Maryland Rules should mirror the Federal Rules of
Evidence. These characteristics are reflected in his analyses of the ad-
missibility of rebuttal evidence, evidence of a defendant's prior crimi-
nal acts, character evidence, prior inconsistent statements, and
hearsay evidence.
25. The committee's note states: "This Rule is not intended to overrule Reed v. State,
and other cases adopting the principles enunciated in Frye v. United States. The required
scientific foundation for the admission of novel scientific techniques or principles is left to
development through case law." MD. R. 5-702 advisory committee's note (citations
omitted).
26. See supra text accompanying note 17 (discussing the effect of Maryland Rule 1-
201 (c)).
27. The Maryland Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land on December 15, 1993. Amendments to Maryland Rules of Procedure; Adoption of
New Title 5, Rules of Evidence, 333 Md. XXXV (1993). The Rules became effective onjuly
1, 1994. Id.
28. See Burral v. State, 352 Md. 707, 737, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (1999) (finding that hypnosis
is a scientific technique subject to the Fye-Reed standard); Williams v. State, 342 Md. 724,
752, 679 A.2d 1106, 1120-21 (1996) (discussing the Fye-Reed standard in relation to the
admissibility of DNA evidence and recommending that, "should the State seek to admit the
[DNA evidence collected by the] PCR [method of DNA testing] at [the defendant's] sec-
ond trial, the trial court should consider conducting a new Frye-Reed hearing on the ques-
tion of whether PCR testing results are admissible"); Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 54, 673
A.2d 221, 228-29 (1996) (noting "general acceptance" in the scientific community as an
avenue by which "novel scientific evidence" can become admissible); see also United States
Gypsum Co. v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 145, 182, 647 A.2d 405, 423 (1994) (holding that for
new scientific techniques to be admissible, the underlying technique must be " 'generally
accepted as reliable within the expert's particular scientific field'" (quoting Reed, 283 Md.
at 381, 391 A.2d at 368)).
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A. Rebuttal Evidence: The Doctrines of Verbal Completeness, Opening the
Door, and Curative Admissibility
Judge Chasanow has recognized the continuing validity of Mary-
land's common law of evidence in a number of opinions.29 The doc-
trines of "verbal completeness," "opening the door," and "curative
admissibility" permit a party, under certain circumstances, to intro-
duce otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to counter or rebut
previously introduced evidence.3" These doctrines, however, had
often been confused,3 ' and Judge Chasanow, with his characteristic
analytic precision, helped clarify the circumstances under which each
of the doctrines apply.32 Important for our purposes, moreover, for
Judge Chasanow these doctrines remain viable following the codifica-
tion of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, although the only doctrine
specifically addressed in the Rules is the doctrine of verbal complete-
ness, and that only with respect to written or recorded statements.
1. The Common Law Doctrines Before the Adoption of the Maryland
Rules of Evidence.-As Judge Chasanow explained in Richardson v.
State,34 the doctrine of verbal completeness permits a party to intro-
duce the remainder of a writing or conversation, part of which was
introduced by an opponent, subject to the following limitations: (1)
no irrelevant information may be admitted; (2) only that portion of
the remainder that concerns the same subject and explains the first
part is admissible; and (3) the remainder is not new substantive testi-
mony, but merely aids in the construction of the conversation or state-
ment as a whole.3 5 Further, "'where the remainder is incompetent,
not merely as to form as in the case of secondary evidence or hearsay,
29. See, e.g., Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 541-46, 693 A.2d 781, 788-91 (1997) (discus-
sing the common law doctrines of "verbal completeness," "opening the door," and "cura-
tive admissibility"); Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 84-93, 629 A.2d 1239, 124247 (1993) (apply-
ing the common law doctrine of "curative admissibility" and discussing the doctrine of
"opening the door"); Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 622-23, 598 A.2d 180, 185-86
(1991) (applying the common law doctrine of "verbal completeness").
30. See supra note 29 (citing cases that discuss or apply these doctrines).
31. See Clark, 332 Md. at 84, 629 A.2d at 1242 (recognizing this problem and discussing
the doctrines of opening the door and curative admissibility "[b]ecause of the confusion
engendered by some cases and some commentators").
32. See, e.g., id. at 84-93, 629 A.2d at 1242-47 (discussing the distinction between the
doctrines of opening the door and curative admissibility).
33. See MD. R. 5-106; infra text accompanying note 38 (setting forth the relevant text of
Rule 5-106).
34. 324 Md. 611, 598 A.2d 180 (1991).
35. Id. at 622, 598 A.2d at 185 (quoting Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 134, 468 A.2d
101, 111 (1983), quoting in turn Feigley v. Balt. Transit Co., 211 Md. 1, 10, 124 A.2d 822,
827 (1956), quoting in turn 7 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2113 (3d ed. 1940)).
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but because of its prejudicial character then the trial judge should
exclude if he finds that the danger of prejudice outweighs the explan-
atory value.' ,,3
6
The Richardson decision was rendered prior to the adoption of
the Maryland Rules of Evidence, which partially codified the common
law doctrine of verbal completeness.3 7 Maryland Rule 5-106 provides
that "[w] hen part or all of a writing or recorded statement is intro-
duced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at
that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement
which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with
it."3" The Rule, however, addresses only the admissibility of writings
or recorded statements,39 while the common law doctrine applies to
conversations as well as to writings and recordings.4 °
In Richardson, the defense elicited testimony from a police detec-
tive concerning several statements made to him by Michael McCoy, a
friend of the defendant who did not testify.41 The detective's testi-
mony pertained to the timing of a telephone call and a meeting be-
tween the defendant and McCoy, and was admitted without objection
from the State.4 2 During the State's redirect examination of the
detective, the trial judge permitted several additional portions of Mc-
Coy's statement to be read into evidence under the doctrine of verbal
completeness.43 This testimony included inculpatory statements alleg-
edly made by the defendant both to McCoy and to another acquain-
36. Id. at 622-23, 598 A.2d at 185 (quoting CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 56, at 146 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)). This is consistent with Mary-
land Rule 5-403, which states that even relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." MD. R. 5-403.
Though Judge Chasanow's formulation would exclude the evidence if the danger of
prejudice outweighed its probative value rather than require prejudice to "substantially"
outweigh probative value as required under Maryland Rule 5-403, the different formula-
tions may be more semantic than effectual.
37. See Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 540-41, 693 A.2d 781, 788 (1997). In Conyers,
Judge Chasanow explained that Maryland Rule 5-106 partially codified the doctrine of ver-
bal completeness with respect to timing. Id,
38. MD. R. 5-106.
39. See id. (permitting the use of the doctrine "[w]hen part or all of a writing or re-
corded statement is introduced by a party").
40. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788 (stating that under the common law
doctrine of completeness, "[the] right of the opponent to put in [evidence] the remainder
[of a writing or conversation was] universally conceded" (quoting Feigly, 211 Md. at 10, 124
A.2d at 827, quoting in turn WIGMORE, supra note 35, § 2113)).
41. Richardson, 324 Md. at 618-21, 598 A.2d at 183-85.
42. Id. at 618, 598 A.2d at 183.
43. Id. at 620, 598 A.2d at 184.
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tance named Fletcher.4 4 Fletcher had related his conversation with
the defendant to McCoy, who in turn reported the defendant's state-
ments to the detective.4 5
Judge Chasanow determined that the introduction of hearsay evi-
dence of the "time" of McCoy's conversation with the defendant did
not give the State the right to introduce hearsay evidence of the "con-
tent" of the conversation,4 6 and concluded that the trial court had
erred in allowing the detective to read the hearsay statements on redi-
rect.47 Chasanow explained that the issue raised by the defense was
the timing of a telephone call and meeting between the defendant
and McCoy, and the inculpatory statements allegedly made by the de-
fendant to McCoy and Fletcher neither explained this issue nor
helped to put it in perspective, as required for admissibility under the
verbal completeness doctrine.48
In Clark v. State,49 another opinion rendered before the Maryland
Rules of Evidence went into effect, Judge Chasanow addressed two
additional common law doctrines related to the admissibility of rebut-
tal evidence: the doctrine of "opening the door" and the doctrine of
"curative admissibility."5" As Chasanow explained, the doctrine of
opening the door is a rule of "expanded relevancy" that permits the
admission of otherwise irrelevant evidence to respond to either "(1)
admissible evidence which generates an issue, or (2) inadmissible evi-
dence admitted . . . over objection."5 Judge Chasanow noted that
44. See id. at 621, 598 A.2d at 184-85 (setting forth the relevant portion of the redirect
examination).
45. See id. The detective testified that McCoy had stated that the defendant called and
told him "'you don't know me and you never heard of me.'" Id., 598 A.2d at 184 (empha-
sis omitted). When McCoy asked the defendant what he had done, the defendant replied,
"I can't tell you. I'm on my way down." Id. The detective also testified that McCoy had
related a conversation that occurred between the defendant and Fletcher, of which
Fletcher had told McCoy. Id., 598 A.2d at 185. According to McCoy, the defendant had
asked Fletcher, "'What's the worst thing you can do?'" and when Fletcher answered, "'Kill
somebody,'" the defendant responded, "'Yeah.'" Id. (emphasis omitted).
46. Id. at 623, 598 A.2d at 185.
47. Id. at 624, 598 A.2d at 186.
48. Id. at 623, 598 A.2d at 185-86. Judge Chasanow found that "the most damaging
statements, i.e., those allegedly made by [the defendant] to Fletcher and then related by
Fletcher to McCoy, were clearly not 'opened' by the defense." Id., 598 A.2d at 186.
49. 332 Md. 77, 629 A.2d 1239 (1993).
50. See id. at 84-93, 629 A.2d at 1242-47.
51. Id at 84-85, 629 A.2d at 1242-43. The doctrine has limitations: Collateral issues
may not be injected into the case, nor may extrinsic evidence on collateral issues be intro-
duced. See id- at 87, 629 A.2d at 1244. Further, evidence admissible under this doctrine
may be excluded by Maryland Rule 5-403 if the probative value of the evidence "is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
323
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when inadmissible evidence is admitted over objection, a party should
not be prevented from introducing counter-evidence to explain or
contradict the initial evidence on the ground that the counter-evi-
dence is incompetent after the court has determined the initial inad-
missible evidence to be competent.52  Put another way, otherwise
incompetent counter-evidence that explains or contradicts initial evi-
dence admitted over objection is rendered competent through the
court's declaration of the initial evidence as competent. This is criti-
cal to the admissibility of such evidence under the doctrine of open-
ing the door, because the doctrine permits the introduction of
evidence that otherwise would have been inadmissible due only to
lack of relevance; if rebuttal evidence would be inadmissible regard-
less of its relevance-that is, incompetent-then it would not be ad-
missible under the doctrine. 53 As Judge Chasanow summarized:
Generally, "opening the door" is simply a contention that
competent evidence which was previously irrelevant is now
relevant through the opponent's admission of other evi-
dence on the same issue.
In sum, "opening the door" is simply a way of saying:
"My opponent has injected an issue into the case, and I
ought to be able to introduce evidence on that issue."54
In Clark, the defendant had been charged with first-degree
rape.55 The State introduced DNA evidence confirming that Clark
had intercourse with the victim. 56 The defense challenged the chain
of custody of clothing and blood specimens taken for DNA analysis,
and in response, the State called a police officer who "had witnessed
Clark's blood being drawn and who had submitted the extracted sam-
ples.., for DNA profiling. '57 During the defense's cross-examination
cumulative evidence." MD. R. 5-403; see also Clark, 332 Md. at 87, 629 A.2d at 1244. In
Clark, Judge Chasanow explained that evidence permitted by the doctrine of opening the
door could be excluded if the court found that the evidence's probative value would be
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Clark, 332 Md. at 87, 629
A.2d at 1244. Because the Maryland Rules of Evidence had not yet been enacted, Chasa-
now relied upon the Federal Rules of Evidence to articulate this general rule. See id. (quot-
ing FED. R. EVID. 403).
52. Clark, 332 Md. at 85, 629 A.2d at 1243 (quoting Lake Roland Elevated Railway v. Weir,
86 Md. 273, 37 A. 714 (1897), for "the principles behind 'opening the door' to answer
inadmissible evidence entered over objection").
53. Id. at 91-92, 629 A.2d at 1246.
54. Id. at 85, 629 A.2d at 1243.
55. Id. at 80, 629 A.2d at 1240.
56. Id. at 81, 629 A.2d at 1241.
57. Id.
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of the officer, the defendant's attorney asked the officer what function
he had served in being present while the defendant's blood was
drawn." The officer began to answer by referring to another report
concerning a rape to which the officer had responded, but the State's
attorney interrupted with a request to approach the bench before the
question was answered. 59 The court refused the request and directed
the officer to answer the question.6' The officer then testified that he
had answered a call for another rape in which Clark was implicated as
the suspect.6 When defense counsel immediately tried to elicit testi-
mony from the officer that DNA testing had exonerated Clark in the
other rape, the State objected and a bench conference ensued.62 The
defense proffered to the trial court that when he had asked the officer
what his function was at the blood drawing, he believed the officer
would respond that he was acting as a witness.6" The defense argued
that the officer's reference to Clark's involvement in the other rape
case would be highly prejudicial if the defense was not permitted to
ask the officer how that case had been resolved.64 The court, how-
ever, ordered defense counsel to "stay away from that other case."65
On appeal, the defense argued that the trial court had erred in
"denying the defense an opportunity to present curative evidence
countering [the officer's] inadmissible and severely prejudicial testi-
mony."66 The State contended that although evidence of the defen-
dant's prior arrest would generally be inadmissible, the defense had
"opened the door" to the improper evidence and was thus precluded
from complaining of error based on its impact.67 The State argued
that because the information had been elicited by the defense's own
cross-examination, the defense had been properly precluded from
correcting the testimony.68
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. Id. Clark had been arrested on two separate rape charges, and DNA profiling was
conducted in both cases, but only one blood sample-the sample that had been drawn in
the presence of the testifying officer-was used for DNA testing in both cases. See id. at 82,
629 A.2d at 1241.
62. Id. at 81-82, 629 A.2d at 1241.
63. Id. at 82, 629 A.2d at 1241.
64. Id. at 82-83, 629 A.2d at 1242.
65. Id. at 83, 629 A.2d at 1242.
66. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that, in Maryland, evidence of "'an accused's prior
arrest, indictment or criminal activity, not resulting in conviction' is inadmissible." Id.
(quoting Hall v. State, 32 Md. App. 49, 57, 358 A.2d 632, 636 (1976)).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Judge Chasanow first explained that the doctrine of opening the
door did not apply to the facts in Clark because the rebuttal evidence
that the defense sought to introduce was hearsay evidence of exculpa-
tory DNA results.69 Because the officer's testimony concerning the
DNA results was hearsay and thus incompetent,7 ° the doctrine of
opening the door was not applicable." This was so because the doc-
trine permits the introduction of rebuttal evidence that is inadmissi-
ble only for reasons of irrelevancy. 72 Judge Chasanow concluded that
the testimony "should only have been admitted, if at all, under the
'curative admissibility' doctrine."73
Judge Chasanow's opinion in Clark was the first from the Court of
Appeals to address the doctrine of curative admissibility, 74 which per-
mits the admission of otherwise irrelevant and incompetent evidence,
on rare occasions, to counter the prejudice caused by previously ad-
mitted incompetent evidence. 75 This is a narrowly applied doctrine,
however, and as Judge Chasanow stated, "the rule of curative admissi-
bility might better be called the 'rule against curative admissibility'
since the rule is more of a general prohibition against admissibility
than a general rule in its favor." 76 Curative admissibility is more lim-
ited than the doctrine of opening the door, and is implicated when a
party seeks "to offer incompetent evidence in response to incompe-
tent evidence . . . admitted without objection."' 77 Judge Chasanow ex-
plained that if a court overrules an objection and permits the
introduction of otherwise incompetent evidence, the court has effec-
69. See id. at 87-88, 629 A.2d at 1244.
70. Judge Chasanow explained that the term "incompetent evidence," as used in this
case, referred to "evidence that is inadmissible for reasons other than relevancy." Id. at 87
n.2, 629 A.2d at 1244 n.2. Such evidence would include, for example, evidence that is
inadmissible hearsay, as well as evidence that is inadmissible "for lack of authentication, or
because of the best evidence rule." Id.
71. Id. at 87-88, 629 A.2d at 1244.
72. See id. at 87, 629 A.2d at 1244. Presumably, Judge Chasanow did not consider the
initial evidence to have been "inadmissible evidence admitted . . . over objection," since
such circumstances would have rendered the defense's counter-evidence competent. Id. at
85, 629 A.2d at 1243.
73. Id. at 92, 629 A.2d at 1246.
74. Id. at 88, 629 A.2d at 1244. Judge Chasanow noted, however, that the Court of
Special Appeals had considered several times what it had referred to as "curative admissi-
bility." Id. (citing Savoy v. State, 64 Md. App. 241, 494 A.2d 957 (1985); Robinson v. State,
53 Md. App. 297, 452 A.2d 1291 (1982)).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id., 629 A.2d at 1244-45. Other courts take a contrary view, permitting application
of the doctrine of curative admissibility even if an objection has been made. See 1 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 15, at 731 & n.2 (Tillers rev. ed.
1983) (citing cases from Iowa, Oregon, and Minnesota that follow this contrary view).
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tively made counter-evidence admissible.78 Under such circum-
stances, "the only issue is relevancy," and the doctrine of opening the
door, rather than curative admissibility, would control.79
Judge Chasanow observed that the doctrine of curative admissibil-
ity is not often invoked to cure inadmissible evidence admitted with-
out timely objection; rather, a party belatedly will move to strike and
will request the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence.80
In some cases, however, the prejudice caused by inadmissible evi-
dence cannot be eliminated by striking the evidence, and the damage
inflicted by the prejudice is greater than the curative effect of a jury
instruction.81 In such cases, the doctrine of opening the door, with its
notion of expanded relevancy, would not allow the damaged party to
counter the prejudice with incompetent evidence because the doc-
trine does not permit rebuttal with otherwise irrelevant and incompe-
tent evidence.82  Under these limited circumstances, "when
inadmissible and highly prejudicial evidence has been admitted with-
out objection and the opposing party wishes to offer inadmissible evi-
dence that would go no further than neutralize the previously
introduced inadmissible evidence, the trial judge has discretion to
permit 'curative admissibility."'8 3 If application of the doctrine is re-
quested and the circumstances are appropriate, the doctrine may rem-
edy the introduction of seriously prejudicial evidence without the
need to declare a mistrial.8 4
Because the doctrine of curative admissibility permits a party to
introduce incompetent evidence-that is, evidence that is inadmissi-
ble for reasons other than irrelevancy-in response to incompetent
evidence introduced without objection, a party might be tempted to
refrain from objecting to incompetent evidence in order to introduce
incompetent rebuttal evidence under the doctrine. Judge Chasanow
sought to prevent the use of such a strategy by requiring that a party's
78. Clark, 332 Md. at 88, 629 A.2d at 1245.
79. Id.; see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (explaining the doctrine of "open-
ing the door").
80. Clark, 332 Md. at 88-89, 629 A.2d at 1245.
81. Id. at 89, 629 A.2d at 1245 (citing Kosmas v. State, 316 Md. 587, 594, 560 A.2d 1137,
1141 (1989)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id at 92, 629 A.2d at 1246-47. In Clark, Chasanow determined that the police
officer's testimony regarding the defendant's involvement in the prior rape case "may have
been sufficiently prejudicial tojustify a mistrial." Id., 629 A.2d at 1246. He explained that
instead of asking for a mistrial, the defense had sought to mitigate the prejudice by intro-
ducing neutralizing testimony from the officer; Chasanow concluded that the defense
should have been afforded this opportunity. Id, 629 A.2d at 1247.
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failure to object to the admitted incompetent evidence not be "a tacti-
cal decision in order to admit its 'curative evidence."'"5 Judge Chasa-
now also set forth the limited circumstances under which a trial judge
has discretion to admit evidence under the theory of curative admissi-
bility. A judge may admit such evidence when:
(1) prejudicial inadmissible evidence was admitted without
timely objection or timely motion to strike; 6
(2) the failure to object or move to strike was not shown to
be an intentional or tactical decision [intended] to admit the
"curative evidence";87
(3) the inadmissible evidence is highly prejudicial and a mo-
tion to strike the previously admitted evidence and a caution-
ary instruction would not cure its prejudicial effect; 8
(4) the "curative" inadmissible evidence goes no further than
neutralizing previously admitted inadmissible prejudicial evi-
dence without injecting additional issues in the case and
does not allow the curing party to gain a tactical advantage
from the failure to object to inadmissible evidence; 9
(5) the curative inadmissible evidence is of the same charac-
ter as the previously admitted inadmissible evidence;9" and
(6) the probative value of the otherwise inadmissible curative
evidence outweighs the danger of "confusion of the issue or
misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, [etc.]."91
85. See id. at 90, 629 A.2d at 1246.
86. Id.
87. Id. Judge Chasanow did not explain which party has the burden of showing that
the failure to object was not a conscious tactical decision. In Clark, Chasanow concluded
that defense counsel did not intend to introduce evidence of the other rape in order to
counter it with the DNA rebuttal evidence, because defense counsel was unaware of the
officer's role in the other rape investigation. Id. at 92, 629 A.2d at 1246.
88. Id. at 91, 629 A.2d at 1246.
89. Id.
90. Id. Judge Chasanow did not elaborate on the meaning of "character" for this re-
quirement. Presumably, inadmissible evidence that is of the same "character" as other
inadmissible evidence could either (1) go to the same issue, or (2) be inadmissible for the
same reason. In Clark, Chasanow concluded that the defense's rebuttal evidence of DNA
results exonerating Clark in the other rape was "of the same character and scope as the
original inadmissible evidence." Id. at 92, 629 A.2d at 1247. The original evidence and
rebuttal evidence in this case were not inadmissible for the same reason (the original evi-
dence that the defendant had been implicated in another rape was inadmissible because it
was evidence of another arrest not resulting in conviction, and the rebuttal evidence was
inadmissible because it constituted hearsay), but both did relate to Clark's involvement in
the other rape. Thus, curative inadmissible evidence that is of the same "character" as
previously admitted inadmissible evidence seems to mean evidence that goes to the same
point as the previously admitted evidence.
91. Id. at 91, 629 A.2d at 1246 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403) (alteration in original).
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Although determining that the application of the doctrine of cur-
ative admissibility is appropriate only on rare occasions, Judge Chasa-
now nonetheless concluded that the doctrine should have been
applied in Clark to permit the defense to introduce testimony to miti-
gate the incriminating evidence that defense counsel inadvertently
had elicited from the police witness. 2 He emphasized that the defen-
dant's attorney had no prior knowledge of the witness's role in the
other rape investigation and thus could not have strategically sought
or anticipated the officer's "blurt" regarding the defendant's involve-
ment. 3 In addition, the prejudice caused by the officer's unrespon-
sive statement was substantial.94 Judge Chasanow further explained
that the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the same scope
and character as the original inadmissible evidence from the same wit-
ness. 5 This neither helped the defendant's case nor hurt the State's
case "beyond the neutralization."96 While he noted that a trial judge
will rarely be reversed for refusing to apply the doctrine of curative
admissibility, the facts of Clark compelled its application. 97
Judge Chasanow's analysis of the doctrines of opening the door
and curative admissibility in Clark extended their applicability beyond
situations in which one party introduces evidence that another party
seeks to rebut, although Chasanow does not explicitly recognize this
extension. In Clark, the defense elicited the testimony-albeit acci-
dentally-that the defense then sought to rebut; the evidence and
counter-evidence came in through the same party.9" Although initially
explaining that the doctrine of opening the door is generally used by
a party when his opponent introduces evidence that the party wishes to
rebut,99 Judge Chasanow later stated that the doctrine could be ap-
plied to the facts of Clark if the defense's rebuttal evidence was "com-
petent evidence that would otherwise be admissible if relevant."10 0 In
92. Id. at 92, 629 A.2d at 1247.
93. Id., 629 A.2d at 1246.
94. Id. As Judge Chasanow explained, "[o]nce elicited .... the damage to Clark's case
cannot be overstated." Id.
95. Id., 629 A.2d at 1247.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 93, 629 A.2d at 1247.
98. See id. at 81-83, 629 A.2d at 1241-42 (setting forth the exchange between the de-
fense counsel and the police officer who offered the initial incompetent evidence and
between the defense counsel and the trial court, which denied the defense the opportunity
to present curative evidence).
99. See id. at 85, 629 A.2d at 1243 ("In sum, 'opening the door' is simply a way of saying:
'My opponent has injected an issue into the case, and I ought to be able to introduce
evidence on that issue.").
100. Id. at 91, 629 A.2d at 1246. In Clark, however, the rebuttal evidence was incompe-
tent because it was inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 87, 629 A.2d at 1244.
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addition, Chasanow explained that if the rebuttal evidence would be
incompetent despite its irrelevance, the principles of curative admissi-
bility could still be applied to determine whether the evidence was
admissible."0 ' Clark thus broadened the applicability of the doctrines
of opening the door and curative admissibility to situations in which
"an adverse witness gives an unresponsive, unanticipated prejudicial
answer to a question," and the same party that asked the question
seeks to introduce competent rebuttal evidence.
1 0 2
2. The Rebuttal Evidence Doctrines After the Adoption of the Rules.-
Judge Chasanow had yet another opportunity to consider and clarify
the doctrines of verbal completeness, opening the door, and curative
admissibility in Conyers v. State,'°3 which was decided after the effective
date of the Maryland Rules of Evidence.' 4 Through his opinion in
Conyers, Chasanow demonstrated that these three common law doc-
trines remain viable despite the adoption of the Maryland Rules.
At defendant Conyers's murder trial, his estranged girlfriend tes-
tified during the State's direct examination that the defendant had
owned two guns-one that she had actually seen and one that she had
learned about during a telephone conversation with the defendant
shortly after he had been incarcerated.1" 5 On cross-examination, the
defense attempted to elicit testimony regarding another conversation
between the defendant and his girlfriend, in which the defendant had
told her that he had given his guns to someone else shortly before the
murders occurred. 10 6 The State objected on hearsay grounds.'0 7 The
defense argued that the doctrine of verbal completeness required the
court "to admit this exculpatory hearsay statement to balance the ef-
fect of the inculpatory hearsay statements elicited [by the State] dur-
ing [the witness's] direct examination." 0 8
Despite the new Rules, Judge Chasanow concluded that the com-
mon law doctrine of verbal completeness-rather than Maryland Rule
5-106-governed the admissibility of the contested evidence. '09 He
explained that Rule 5-106 had partially codified the doctrine of verbal
101. Id. at 91-92, 629 A.2d at 1246.
102. Id. at 91, 629 A.2d at 1246.
103. 345 Md. 525, 693 A.2d 781 (1997).
104. See supra note 27.
105. Conyers, 345 Md. at 537, 693 A.2d at 786.
106. Id. at 540, 693 A.2d at 788.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788. For a discussion of the function and applicability of
Rule 5-106, see infra note 111.
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completeness with respect to timing,t1 ° allowing "certain writings or
recorded statements to be admitted earlier in the proceedings than
the common law doctrine" allows.1" 1 Rule 5-106 did not, however,
change the requirements for admissibility under the common law doc-
trine, nor did it allow the admission of otherwise inadmissible evi-
dence, "'except to the extent that it is necessary, in fairness, to explain
what the opposing party has elicited."' 112 Further, where otherwise
inadmissible evidence is admitted under the doctrine, the evidence is
admitted "merely as an explanation of previously-admitted evidence
and not as substantive proof."'11 Chasanow concluded that because
the defense had attempted to introduce evidence of the conversation
between the defendant and his girlfriend concerning the location of
the guns during its cross-examination of the girlfriend, rather than
attempting to introduce the evidence contemporaneously with her testi-
mony on direct that the defendant had owned two guns, the issue was
not one of timing, and thus Rule 5-106 was not applicable."'
Judge Chasanow went on to analyze the admissibility of evidence
of the conversation under the common law doctrine of verbal com-
pleteness, 1 15 and held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
by refusing to admit the evidence.1 ' Although no Maryland cases
were found under the common law doctrine or Rule 5-106 that admit-
ted a statement or writing that was not the remaining part of a single
statement or writing, Judge Chasanow explained that under "appro-
priate circumstance [s]," the common law doctrine would permit the
admission of a separate writing or conversation in order to place a
110. Conyers, 345 Md. at 540, 693 A.2d at 788.
111. Id. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788 (citing MD. R. 5-106 advisory committee's note). Under
Rule 5-106, a party can introduce evidence of a writing or recorded statement during his
opponent's direct examination of a witness to explain a writing or recorded statement
introduced by his opponent, rather than having to wait until cross-examination, as contem-
plated by the common law doctrine of verbal completeness. MD. R. 5-106. The commit-
tee's note to Rule 5-106 states, however, that common law timing (that is, introduction of
rebuttal evidence during cross-examination) remains as an alternative with regard to writ-
ings and recorded statements. MD. R. 5-106 advisory committee's note. The committee's
note further states that "timing under the common law remains applicable to oral state-
ments." Id.
112. Conyers, 345 Md. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788 (quoting MD. R. 5-106 advisory commit-
tee's note).
113. Id. (citing MD. R. 5-106 advisory committee's note).
114. Id. Although not discussed by Chasanow, Rule 5-106 would have been inapplicable
because the disputed testimony involved an oral conversation; only written and recorded
conversations are covered by the Rule. MD. R. 5-106; see supra note 38 and accompanying
text.
115. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 541-44, 693 A.2d at 788-90.
116. Id. at 543, 693 A.2d at 789.
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previously admitted writing or conversation in context.' 17 Judge
Chasanow cited the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Baca"8 as an example of the "appropriate circumstance [s]" warrant-
ing introduction of a separate statement to place an initial statement
in context.119 Unlike Baca, however, where the jury "clearly could
have been misled by the first statement if not also allowed to consider
the second,"120 in Conyers, the State had questioned the defendant's
girlfriend about a conversation in which she and the defendant had
discussed the fact that he had two guns, not where those guns were
located. 2' Thus, according to Judge Chasanow, evidence of a second
conversation between the defendant and his girlfriend concerning the
location of the guns would not help to place the conversation regard-
ing the defendant's ownership of the guns in context. 122
Judge Chasanow also emphasized that even if the two statements
at issue had been different parts of the same conversation, the defen-
dant's statement regarding the location of the guns still may have not
qualified for admission under the doctrine of verbal completeness. 123
Although the statement would have been an admission if offered by
the State, it was inadmissible hearsay when offered by the defen-
117. Id. at 542, 693 A.2d at 789. The language of Rule 5-106 expressly permits the intro-
duction of a separate writing or recorded statement. MD. R. 5-106; see supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
118. 902 P.2d 65 (N.M. 1995).
119. Conyers, 345 Md. at 542, 693 A.2d at 789. In Baca, the defendant appealed his
convictions for the murder of his wife and the attempted murder of his daughter. Baca,
902 P.2d at 67-68. At trial, the State had introduced a statement made by the daughter in a
therapy session that she was afraid of dogs because she had been bitten by one at the house
where "they killed me." Id. at 69. The State's theory was that the defendant and another
family friend, Flores (whose nickname was "Huero"), had committed the crimes, and the
daughter's use of the word "they" supported this theory. Id. at 68-69. The defendant ar-
gued that he should have been allowed to introduce another statement made by the
daughter during another therapy session in which she had explained that the word "they"
meant "Huero." See id. at 69. The Supreme Court of New Mexico held that the second
statement should have been admitted under the "doctrine of completeness," as codified in
New Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-106, id. at 72, which is New Mexico's equivalent of Mary-
land Rule 5-106. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 543, 693 A.2d at 789 (describing the similarity
between the New Mexico and Maryland Rules). The court explained that the daughter's
statement, "they killed me," was misleading when viewed alone because when she said
"they," she meant "Huero." Baca, 902 P.2d at 72. The second statement was admissible to
place in context the daughter's use of the word "they" in her first statement. Id.
120. Conyers, 345 Md. at 544, 693 A.2d at 790.
121. Id., 693 A.2d at 789.
122. See id., 693 A.2d at 790 (explaining that the trial judge acted within his discretion
when he refused to admit evidence of the second conversation).
123. Id
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dant.124 The defendant's statement that he owned two guns was of-
fered by the State, thus qualifying the statement as an admission and
an exception to the rule excluding hearsay. 25 In contrast, his state-
ment regarding the location of the guns constituted inadmissible
hearsay because it was the defense that sought to introduce the
statement. 1
26
As Judge Chasanow explained in Richardson, incompetent rebut-
tal evidence offered under the doctrine of verbal completeness should
be excluded "'if the danger of prejudice outweighs the explanatory
value"' of the evidence. 127 Chasanow iterated his concern with the
competency of rebuttal evidence in Conyers, stating that "[t]he doc-
trine of verbal completeness does not allow evidence that is otherwise
inadmissible as hearsay to become admissible solely because it is de-
rived from a single writing or conversation." 121 When otherwise inad-
missible hearsay evidence is admitted under the doctrine of verbal
completeness, however, it is admitted for its explanatory value and not
as substantive testimony, 129 and thus would not constitute hearsay." 0
Chasanow nonetheless appeared to consider the incompetency of re-
buttal evidence as a factor weighing against its admission under the
doctrine13 ' -possibly because evidence that is incompetent on the
merits may be misused by a jury when offered only for explanation.
124. Id. Maryland Rule 5-803(a) (1) creates a hearsay exception for statements made by
a party and offered against that party at trial. MD. R. 5-803(a) (1). Thus, a statement made
by a defendant may be admitted against the defendant by the State, but the same statement
may not be admissible if offered by the defendant himself. Conyers, 345 Md. at 544-45, 693
A.2d at 790 (quoting Muir v. State, 64 Md. App. 648, 656, 498 A.2d 666, 670 (1985)).
125. Conyers, 345 Md. at 544, 693 A.2d at 790 (citing MD. R. 5-803(a) (1)).
126. Id.
127. Richardson v. State, 324 Md. 611, 622-23, 598 A.2d 180, 185 (1991) (quoting
MCCORMICK, supra note 36, § 56, at 146). Note, however, that under Maryland Rule 5-403,
a trial judge should exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, regardless of whether the evidence violates any other specific
rule. See MD. R. 5-403.
128. Conyers, 345 Md. at 545, 693 A.2d at 790 (citing CHARLEs T. MCCORMICK, MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE § 56 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)).
129. Id. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788 (citing MD. R. 5-106 advisory committee's note); Richard-
son, 324 Md. at 622, 598 A.2d at 185 (quoting Bowers v. State, 298 Md. 115, 134, 468 A.2d
101, 111 (1983), quoting in turn Feigly v. Balt. Transit Co., 211 Md. 1, 10, 124 A.2d 822,
827 (1956), quoting in turn WIGMoRE, supra note 35, § 2113).
130. See MD. R. 5-80 1 (c) (defining "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted").
131. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 544-45, 693 A.2d at 790 (explaining that hearsay statements
offered by the declarant as evidence at trial are incompetent and therefore are less likely to
be admitted under the doctrine of verbal completeness).
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Richardson and Conyers suggest that Judge Chasanow's refusal to
apply the doctrine of verbal completeness turns on whether the jury
would be misled by the initial evidence without admission of the re-
buttal evidence, rather than on whether the rebuttal evidence was in-
competent. In Richardson, the issue raised by the defense was the
timing of a telephone call, and the defendant's incriminating state-
ments that the State sought to introduce did not explain this issue or
help put it in perspective. 132 Similarly, in Conyers, the introduction of
the statement regarding the defendant's disposition of his guns did
not help to place in context the statement that the defendant owned
two guns, and did not present a situation in which the jury clearly
could have been misled if not permitted to consider the rebuttal
evidence.' 3
If a jury would be misled by initial evidence if not also permitted
to consider rebuttal evidence, however, the rebuttal evidence may be
admissible under the doctrine of verbal completeness, even if the evi-
dence would be incompetent and inadmissible on the merits.' 34 In
Baca, the Supreme Court of New Mexico admitted otherwise incompe-
tent hearsay evidence under the doctrine. 35 Judge Chasanow's belief
that Baca provided an example of appropriate circumstances warrant-
ing the application of the doctrine of verbal completeness"3 6 suggests
his approval of the admission of such evidence under the doctrine in
Maryland. Further, Judge Chasanow's statement in Conyers that evi-
dence inadmissible as hearsay does not become admissible "solely be-
132. Richardson, 324 Md. at 623, 598 A.2d at 185-86.
133. Conyers, 345 Md. at 544, 693 A.2d at 790.
134. This view is consistent with that of many courts and commentators. See, e.g., United
States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977, 981 (7th Cir. 1986) (explaining that otherwise inadmissi-
ble evidence may be admitted pursuant to Federal Rule 106 for the limited purpose of
correcting a misleading impression created by previously admitted evidence); 2 CLIFFORD
S. FISHMANJONES ON EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 11:39, at 369 (7th ed. 1994) ("State-
ments are sometimes made to the effect that the 'rule of completeness,' or [Federal Rule
of Evidence] 106, only permits the acceleration of the introduction of evidence that was
otherwise admissible, but does not permit introduction of evidence that was otherwise
inadmissible."); id. at 370 ("The better view, however, is that the 'rule of completeness'
permits introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence for the limited purposes of ex-
plaining or putting other, already admitted evidence, into context, or avoiding misleading
the jury.").
135. State v. Baca, 902 P.2d 65, 72 (N.M. 1995). In Baca, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico admitted a videotaped conversation between the victim and her therapist in which
the victim had made statements that tended to alter the meaning of other statements that
she had made when identifying her assailant. Id. Ordinarily, the videotaped conversation
would have been inadmissible hearsay. See id. at 70; N.M. R. ANN. 11-801 (C) (2001) (defin-
ing "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted").
136. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 542-43, 693 A.2d at 789.
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cause it is derived from a single writing or conversation"1 17 suggests
that if other criteria were met-for example, the jury would be misled
without the clarifying statement-then the explanatory value of the
rebuttal evidence might warrant admission.
Judge Chasanow also considered the applicability of the doctrines
of opening the door and curative admissibility in Conyers. 138 He deter-
mined that the doctrine of opening the door did not apply since the
rebuttal testimony proffered by the defense was inadmissible-not be-
cause it was irrelevant, but because it was incompetent hearsay. 139 Cit-
ing Clark v. State,'4 ° he iterated that the doctrine does not allow the
admission of incompetent evidence."' Judge Chasanow also con-
cluded that the curative admissibility doctrine did not apply because
the initial evidence offered by the State, which the defense sought to
counter with its incompetent inadmissible evidence, was competent
and admissible.
14 2
Judge Chasanow's analytic precision is evident in his identifica-
tion and explanation of the subtle differences between the doctrines
of verbal completeness, opening the door, and curative admissibility.
His analyses of the doctrines provide guidance for a party seeking to
introduce rebuttal evidence in order to explain or counter previously
introduced evidence and indicate that in order to determine which
doctrine controls the admission of such evidence, the nature of both
the rebuttal evidence and the initial evidence must be examined.
143
Judge Chasanow's opinions also indicate that these common law
doctrines survive the codification of Maryland's evidence law, effectu-
137. Id. at 545, 693 A.2d at 790.
138. Id. at 545-46, 693 A.2d at 790-91.
139. Id. at 546, 693 A.2d at 790-91. Since the original evidence introduced by the State
was an admission by the defendant (an exception to the hearsay rule), the original evi-
dence was not "inadmissible evidence admitted over objection" and thus did not render
the rebutting inadmissible evidence competent. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying
text.
140. 332 Md. 77, 85, 629 A.2d 1239, 1243 (1993).
141. Conyers, 345 Md. at 546, 693 A.2d at 790. Judge Chasanow relied on Clark, which
explained that the doctrine of opening the door makes irrelevant but otherwise competent
evidence relevant for the limited purpose of responding to evidence offered by the oppos-
ing party on the same side. See Clark, 332 Md. at 84-88, 629 A.2d at 1242-44 (explaining in
detail the doctrine of opening the door and its application and limitations in Maryland).
142. Conyers, 345 Md. at 546, 693 A.2d at 791 (referring to testimony offered by the State
that indicated that the defendant owned two .38-caliber handguns).
143. See id. at 541-45, 693 A.2d at 788-90 (discussing factors affecting the admissibility of
evidence under the doctrine of verbal completeness); id. at 545-46, 693 A.2d at 790-91
(discussing factors affecting the admissibility of evidence under the doctrine of opening
the door); id. at 546, 693 A.2d at 791 (discussing factors affecting the admissibility of evi-
dence under the doctrine of curative admissibility).
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ating the intent behind Maryland Rule 1-201 to maintain the common
law where not inconsistent with the codified Rules.' 44 Although he
concluded that Maryland Rule 5-106 codified the doctrine of verbal
completeness with respect to timing,'4 5 Judge Chasanow also asserted
that the Rule did not "change the requirements for admissibility
under the common law doctrine,"146 and he applied the common law
doctrine in Conyers, which was decided after the codified Rules be-
came effective.' 47 Judge Chasanow's departure from Professor Im-
winkelried's view that codification of evidence rules eliminates
common law doctrines not expressly provided for in those rules148 be-
comes even more apparent in his discussion of the application of the
doctrines of opening the door and curative admissibility in Conyers.149
Although he ultimately concluded that the doctrines did not apply,150
his consideration of them indicates that he still found them to be via-
ble possibilities, though neither of the doctrines is explicitly men-
tioned in the Maryland Rules of Evidence.
B. Evidence of Prior Criminal Acts of a Defendant
Despite the enactment of Title 5, Maryland's common law of evi-
dence also continues to play a role in determining the admissibility of
a criminal defendant's prior acts when offered for purposes other
than proving the defendant's poor character. In Streater v. State,15 1
Judge Chasanow, examining the admissibility of "other crimes" evi-
dence as substantive proof under Maryland Rule 5-404(b), explored
144. See supra text accompanying note 17 (quoting Maryland Rule 1-201(c), which ex-
plains the relationship between the codified Maryland Rules of Evidence and existing com-
mon law rules of evidence).
145. Conyers, 345 Md. at 540, 693 A.2d at 788.
146. Id. at 541, 693 A.2d at 788.
147. Conyers was decided in 1997; the newly codified Maryland Rules of Evidence be-
came effective on July 1, 1994. See supra note 27.
148. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 879, 881 (1988) ("In a series of articles, the Author has argued that the Federal
Rules operate much like a self-contained, civil-law code, abolishing common-law rules that
Congress failed to codify." (footnotes omitted) (citing EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, Federal Rule
of Evidence 402: The Second Revolution, 6 REv. LITIG. 129 (1987); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the Admissibility
of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 577 (1984); EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Need
to Amend Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): The Threat to the Future of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
30 VILL. L. REv. 1465 (1985))).
149. See Conyers, 345 Md. at 545-46, 693 A.2d at 790-91. Chasanow considered these
doctrines as possible methods for allowing the defendant to offer evidence rebutting the
State's evidence that linked the defendant to the murder weapon. See id.
150. Id. at 546, 693 A.2d at 791.
151. 352 Md. 800, 724 A.2d 111 (1999).
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the use of such evidence for purposes other than character. 152 Rule 5-
404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, while not admissible to
prove character, may be admissible for other purposes.153 These pur-
poses include proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, com-
mon scheme or plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.1
54
The defendant in Streater, who had been convicted of harassment,
stalking, and telephone misuse, 155 challenged the admissibility of fac-
tual findings contained within a protective order that was admitted as
substantive evidence during the State's case-in-chief.1 56 This protec-
tive order contained three factual determinations that constituted
other-crimes evidence.1 57  In his analysis, Judge Chasanow distin-
guished between the admissibility of the protective order itself and the
admissibility of the factual findings contained within the protective
order. Chasanow explained that "[a] fundamental principle of the
law of evidence is that inadmissible evidence does not become admis-
sible simply by being clothed within evidence that is admissible."
58
While acknowledging that the fact of the protective order had been
properly placed in evidence, 159 Judge Chasanow questioned whether
the written protective order should have been admitted-due to the
other crimes evidence contained within it-because no threshold in-
152. See id. at 806-22, 724 A.2d at 114-22.
153. MD. R. 5-404(b).
154. Id.
155. Streater, 352 Md. at 803, 724 A.2d at 112.
156. Id. at 804, 812, 724 A.2d at 113, 117.
157. Id. at 815, 724 A.2d at 118. The findings within the protective order that consti-
tuted other crimes were as follows: (1) the defendant placed the victim "'in fear of immi-
nent serious bodily harm'" and "'threaten[ed] to harm'" her; (2) the defendant "'broke
into the house and took her money'"; and (3) the defendant committed a "'[b]attery or
assault and battery.'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting the protective order).
158. Id. at 813-14, 724 A.2d at 117.
159. Judge Chasanow explained that the protective order itself had special relevance, at
least with respect to the harassment charge. See id. at 812-13, 724 A.2d at 117. Judge
Chasanow explained: "Harassment prohibits a person from 'maliciously engag[ing] in a
course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person . . . [a]fter reasonable
warning or request to desist by or on behalf of the other person . . . .'" Id. (alterations in
original) (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 121A(c) (1996)). The protective order di-
rected the defendant not to contact, attempt to contact, or harass the victim, and to vacate
the home he had shared with the victim. Id. at 812-13, 724 A.2d at 117. The protective
order was thus relevant to, and highly probative of, both the defendant's intent and the
fact that he had notice not to contact the victim. Id. at 814 n.6, 724 A.2d at 117 n.6.
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quiry was conducted by the trial judge regarding the admissibility of
that evidence.
160
Although Streater was decided under the codified Rules of Evi-
dence, Judge Chasanow incorporated the three-pronged test for ad-
missibility of other crimes evidence that had developed in Maryland
under the common law.16 1 Under the test, a trial judge must first de-
termine whether the other crimes evidence fits within one or more
special relevancy exceptions, such as those provided by Rule 5-
404(b).162 Next, the judge determines whether the defendant's in-
volvement in such crimes has been established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence. 16' Finally, if these requirements have been met, the
judge weighs the probative value of the other crimes evidence against
the prejudice likely to result from its admission.164 As Judge Chasa-
now explained, "[t]hese substantive and procedural protections are
necessary to guard against the potential misuse of other crimes or bad
acts evidence and avoid the risk that the evidence will be used improp-
erly by the jury against a defendant."1 65 Chasanow also emphasized
that a trial court should state on the record its reasons for admitting
other crimes evidence, thus enabling an appellate court to determine
whether Rule 5-404(b) has been correctly applied as interpreted
through the case law. 166
Streater also provides an example of Chasanow's willingness to de-
part from his expressed desire to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence,
as written, in Maryland. Judge Chasanow approved of and incorpo-
rated the three-pronged common law test into Rule 5-404(b), even
though the language of the Rule is silent as to the specific procedure
to be utilized by a trial court in determining the admissibility of other
crimes evidence under the Rule. Under Federal Rule of Evidence
404, evidence of prior acts will be admissible if a reasonable jury could
find the acts to have been committed,'67 whereas under the rule
160. See id. at 813, 724 A.2d at 117 ("[T]he trial court in the instant case ruled the entire
protective order form admissible without addressing in the record the admissibility of fac-
tual references to other crimes that the order contained.").
161. See id. at 807, 724 A.2d at 114 (quoting the three-pronged test stated in State v.
Faulkner, 314 Md. 630, 634-35, 552 A.2d 896, 898 (1989), and citing Ayers v. State, 335 Md.
602, 632, 645 A.2d 22, 37 (1994), and Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 335, 631 A.2d 424, 427
(1993)).
162. See id. (quoting Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898).
163. Id. (quoting Faulkner, 314 Md. at 634, 552 A.2d at 898).
164. Id. (quoting Faulkner, 314 Md. at 635, 552 A.2d at 898).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 810, 724 A.2d at 116.
167. In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), the Supreme Court held that
evidence of prior acts need only meet the Rule 104(b) test for admissibility. See id. at 689-
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adopted by Judge Chasanow in Streater, the defendant's involvement
in the other crimes must have been established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence."6 Applying these rules to the admissibility of the other
crimes evidence in Streater, Judge Chasanow concluded that the trial
judge had failed to apply Rule 5-404(b) correctly with respect to the
findings. 6 9 Chasanow explained that there was no indication that the
trial court had considered or assessed the admissibility of the other
crimes,"' and he ultimately held that "reversible error occurs where
significant evidence of other crimes was admitted without any appar-
ent on-the-record consideration by the trial court."17 1
Since the adoption of Title 5, Judge Chasanow has written a num-
ber of opinions on matters of evidence law. Given his expressed view
on the importance of uniformity,1 7 2 one might have expected that
these opinions would have hewn closely to lines established by the
Federal Rules and the opinions construing them, at least where the
preexisting common law is not inconsistent with the applicable Rule.
As we shall see, however, that has not always been the case.
C. Character, Impeachment, and Rehabilitation
Despite his commitment to the Federal Rules, once cases started
arriving at the Court of Appeals, Judge Chasanow seemed a bit less
faithful to federal evidence law. Perhaps the most well-known exam-
ple of this is his decision in Sahin v. State.1 73 The defendant, Isa Sahin,
had been convicted of cocaine distribution.174 At trial, he testified on
his own behalf.1 75 He then sought to introduce evidence of character
through witnesses who would testify as to his reputation for truthful-
ness. 176 The trial court excluded the reputation evidence, reasoning
that truthfulness was not a character trait relevant to whether the de-
fendant had sold narcotics. 177 Further, because the defendant's char-
91. Thus, such evidence is admissible if a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance
of the evidence that the prior acts were committed. See id. at 690.
168. Streater, 352 Md. at 807, 724 A.2d at 114.
169. Id. at 811, 724 A.2d at 116.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 821, 724 A.2d at 121.
172. See Chasanow's Rules Dissent, supra note 16, at XXXIX.
173. 337 Md. 304, 653 A.2d 452 (1995).
174. Id. at 307, 653 A.2d at 454.
175. Id. at 308, 653 A.2d at 454.
176. Id. at 309, 653 A.2d at 454.
177. Id. Under both Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and its Maryland counterpart, Mary-
land Rule 5-401, evidence is relevant only if it has "any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; MD. R. 5401. Under
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acter for truthfulness had not been attacked on cross-examination,
the trial court found that the introduction of evidence of good charac-
ter for truthfulness was an impermissible attempt to bolster the defen-
dant's credibility.' 78 The charge of narcotics distribution, according
to the trial court, was not in itself an attack on the defendant's
veracity. 1
79
On appeal, Sahin argued that truthfulness was a character trait
relevant to the charge of cocaine distribution and that he should have
been permitted to introduce evidence of his good character for truth-
fulness. 0 Indeed, the Court of Appeals had recently determined that
distribution of narcotics was relevant to credibility, thus allowing a de-
fendant's testimony to be impeached by evidence of his prior convic-
tion for narcotics distribution.' Nevertheless, Judge Chasanow,
writing for the court, declined to hold that evidence of good character
for truthfulness is relevant evidence in determining whether the de-
fendant is unlikely to have distributed drugs.'82 So, according to
Judge Chasanow, drug-dealing is relevant to veracity, but veracity is not
relevant to whether one has dealt drugs. Now, while this may be ana-
lytically sound, it calls to mind the ancient theological inquiry about
angels and the heads of pins.
But Judge Chasanow was not yet finished. He went on to con-
sider whether evidence that the defendant had committed the acts
charged-that is, evidence on the merits of the case-itself consti-
tuted an attack on the defendant's credibility.' He concluded that if
the crime for which the defendant was being tried was relevant to ve-
racity-as the court had held drug dealing was184-evidence that the
defendant had committed the offense necessarily entailed an attack
on the defendant's character for truthfulness.1 85 Thus, if the defen-
dant were to testify, he would be entitled to offer evidence of good
character for veracity by way of rehabilitation.18 6
both the Federal and Maryland Rules, "[e]vidence [that] is not relevant is not admissible."
FED. R. EvD. 402; MD. R. 5-402.
178. See Sahin, 337 Md. at 309, 653 A.2d at 454-55.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 310, 653 A.2d at 455.
181. State v. Giddens, 335 Md. 205, 217, 642 A.2d 870, 876 (1994). Interestingly, the
court also noted that possession of narcotics is not probative of credibility. Id. at 216, 642
A.2d at 875 (citing Morales v. State, 325 Md. 330, 339, 600 A.2d 851, 855 (1992); Lowery v.
State, 292 Md. 2, 2, 437 A.2d 193, 193 (1981)).
182. Sahin, 337 Md. at 311-12, 653 A.2d at 456.
183. See id at 313-14, 653 A.2d at 456-57.
184. See Giddens, 335 Md. at 217, 642 A.2d at 876.
185. Sahin, 337 Md. at 314, 653 A.2d at 457.
186. Id.
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To sum up, a defendant charged with an offense that "counts" as
relevant to veracity1 87 may not introduce evidence of good character
for truthfulness on the merits of whether he committed the offense,
but may, if he testifies, offer such evidence to bolster his credibility,
regardless of whether that credibility has been directly attacked by the
prosecution. In short, there is a one way inference from conduct to
character for truthfulness, but character for truthfulness will not sup-
port an inference that the defendant did not commit the charged
conduct (unless, presumably, the charged conduct is directly related
to veracity-perjury, for example).
Judge Chasanow clarified the meaning of Sahin three years later
in Sippio v. State. 88 In Sippio, the defendant, who was charged with
murder (a veracity-related offense under the standards of Maryland
Rule 5-609189), attempted to introduce evidence of his good character
for truthfulness before testifying.1 90 The court, per Judge Chasanow,
held that, to take advantage of Sahin, the defendant must testify or at
least formally proffer that he or she will testify.
19 1
Sahin's trial was not governed by the then-new Maryland Rules of
Evidence, but Judge Chasanow made it clear that the result would be
the same under the Rules.19 2 Sippio's trial, of course, was controlled
by the Rules. Given Judge Chasanow's insistence on uniformity be-
tween the Federal and Maryland Rules of Evidence when the Mary-
land Rules were under consideration for adoption by the Court of
Appeals,1 93 it is noteworthy that his analysis in Sahin is not consistent
with federal cases interpreting the applicable Federal Rule.19 4 Most
187. Maryland Rule 5-609(a) defines veracity-related offenses as "infamous crime [s] or
other crime[s] relevant to the witness's credibility." MD. R. 609(a).
188. 350 Md. 633, 714 A.2d 864 (1998).
189. See supra note 187.
190. Sippio, 350 Md. at 640, 714 A.2d at 868.
191. Id. at 664-66, 714 A.2d at 880.
192. See Sahin, 337 Md. at 315 n.3, 653 A.2d at 457 n.3 (explaining that Maryland Rule 5-
608(a) (2), "Rehabilitation by a Character Witness," was not in effect during Sahin's trial,
but that "[t]he newly adopted Maryland Rules of Evidence are consistent with our holding
in the instant case"); see also Sippio, 350 Md. at 663 n.10, 714 A.2d at 879 n.10 ("Although
[Maryland Rule 5-608] was not in effect at the time of the trial court's decision in Sahin, it
remains consistent with this Court's ruling in Sahin.").
193. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
194. Federal Rule 608(a) provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form
of opinion or reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the evidence may
refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthful-
ness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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federal courts hold that neither a criminal charge nor the contradic-
tion of a defendant's testimony by State's witnesses "constitutes an at-
tack on a defendant's character for truthfulness sufficient to permit
the defendant to introduce evidence of good character for truthful-
ness."1"5 The cognate Maryland Rule is not identical to Federal Rule
608(a),19 6 but despite his earlier expressed concern about such differ-
ences, Judge Chasanow recognized that the differences were not
material. 197
Nor is this the only instance in which Judge Chasanow has
reached results not necessarily consistent with federal precedent con-
struing Federal Rules of Evidence that are essentially the same as the
corresponding Maryland Rules.1 98 It is in the best tradition of com-
mon law judging to allow one's theoretical position, even when based
on what appears to be sound policy (here, uniformity between state
and federal practice), to be informed by the facts of the particular
case to be decided. If the method of the common law has taught us
anything, it is that the soundness of a theoretical position can best be
tested through the adjudication of particular cases. It is a lesson that
Judge Chasanow has learned well.
Sahin and Sippio demonstrate another characteristic of Judge
Chasanow's approach to judging: he combines analytic precision with
an appreciation of the way in which legal doctrine operates in the real
195. Sahin, 337 Md. at 316, 653 A.2d at 458 (citing United States v. Dring, 930 F.2d 687,
690-92 (9th Cir. 1991) (distinguishing between those attacks on credibility that give de-
fendants the right to rehabilitate and those that do not, and explaining that rehabilitation
is not triggered by the introduction of evidence that contradicts the defendant's testi-
mony); United States v. Danehy, 680 F.2d 1311, 1314 (11 th Cir. 1982) (discussing Rule 608
and finding that "[g]overnment counsel pointing out inconsistencies in testimony and ar-
guing that the accused's testimony is not credible does not constitute an attack on the
accused's reputation for truthfulness"); United States v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 382 n.1
(1st Cir. 1982) (applying Federal Rule of Evidence 608 and explaining that a defendant
may not offer character evidence on his or her own behalf merely because he or she takes
the stand or because other witnesses contradict the defendant's testimony); 3JACK B. WEIN-
STEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE 608[08] (1988), at 608-64-
65).
196. Rule 5-608(a) (2) states that "[a]fter the character for truthfulness of a witness has
been attacked, a character witness may testify (A) that the witness has a good reputation for
truthfulness or (B) that, in the character witness's opinion, the witness is a truthful per-
son." MD. R. 5-608(a) (2); see also supra note 194 (providing the text of Federal Rule
608(a)).
197. See Sippio, 350 Md. at 663 n.10, 714 A.2d at 879 n.10 (noting that "Maryland Rule 5-
608 . . . differs slightly from its federal counterpart mainly in style and organization, but
not in substance"); Sahin, 337 Md. at 315 n.3, 653 A.2d at 457 n.3 (explaining that the
Maryland Rule "differs slightly in form from its federal counterpart").
198. See supra notes 151-172 and accompanying text (discussingjudge Chasanow's adop-
tion of a standard for the admissibility of other-crimes evidence under Maryland Rule 5-
404(b) that was different from the standard used under the corresponding Federal Rule).
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world. The recognition that the inference from behavior to character
for trustworthiness is not the same as the inference from character for
trustworthiness to behavior is a rigorous analytic distinction. And the
recognition that a jury is likely to draw an adverse inference about a
criminal defendant's credibility from the mere bringing of the prose-
cution displays an awareness of the world of the criminal courtroom
not always reflected in the sterility of legislated rules.199 The Sahin
solution is a nice balance between theory and reality, despite its lack
of supporting precedent.
D. Prior Inconsistent Statements
Sahin and Sippio are not the only examples of Judge Chasanow's
ability to temper sophisticated legal analysis with recognition of real
world contexts. His opinions regarding the use of prior inconsistent
statements provide another demonstration of his superior analytic
precision. These opinions also illustrate Chasanow's tendency to de-
fer to the plain language of codified rules of evidence when those
rules are inconsistent with established common law principles.
A witness's prior inconsistent statement may be admissible to im-
peach the witness's testimony,20 and under some circumstances, as
substantive evidence. 20 1 When such statements are technically limited
to impeachment, however, a jury may nonetheless ignore such nice-
ties and use the prior statement for its substantive truth.20 2 Thus, an
adverse party is typically eager to "impeach" a witness through the use
199. The jury may draw this inference, however, regardless of whether the nature of the
charged offense implicates questions of the defendant's veracity. Given the defendant's
obvious interest in the outcome, the jury is likely to question the defendant's veracity with-
out regard to the nature of the offense. See Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard
Place: The Bight to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 17-18 & 17
n.77 (1997) (explaining that the credibility of a criminal defendant's testimony will be
"substantially diminished" because of his or her interest in the outcome of the proceeding,
and that, for this reason, under the common law, criminal defendants had historically
been barred from testifying on their own behalf).
200. See MD. R. 5-616(a) ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked through ques-
tions asked of the witness, including questions that are directed at: (1) Proving under Rule
5-613 ['Prior Statements of Witnesses'] that the witness has made statements that are in-
consistent with the witness's present testimony . . ").
201. See MD. R. 5-802.1 (a) (declaring that prior inconsistent statements made by a testi-
fying witness that were "(1) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (2) reduced to writing and signed by the
declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic
means contemporaneously with the making of the statement" are not excluded by the
hearsay rule).
202. See Nance v. State, 331 Md. 549, 566, 629 A.2d 633, 642 (1993) (characterizing
"separating substantive proof from impeachment evidence" as a "difficult task" for jurors to
accomplish).
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of that witness's prior inconsistent statement in order to get that state-
ment before the jury.
In Bradley v. State,20 3 Judge Chasanow propounded the rule that
in a criminal case, the prosecution is not permitted, over objection, to
inquire into an area independent of the witness's substantive testi-
mony for the sole purpose of impeaching the witness by using a prior
inconsistent statement that would otherwise be inadmissible. 204 In
Bradley, the defendant was charged with kidnapping, armed robbery,
and other related offenses.2 °5 At trial, the victim of the robbery testi-
fied that, as she left her car, a man approached her with a gun and
ordered her back into the car.21 6 After driving several blocks, the vic-
tim was ordered out of the car by the assailant, who drove off in the
car.207 To place the defendant in the victim's car close to the time of
the robbery, the State proffered the victim's car phone bill, "which
indicated that calls were placed from her car phone to a particular
phone number within one-half hour of the theft. '20 8 The State called
as a witness the defendant's cousin, who testified that his home phone
number matched the number on the victim's car phone bill and that
he had received phone calls from the defendant after the car had
been stolen.209
The prosecution next elicited, over objection, a denial from the
defendant's cousin that he told a police detective that the defendant,
during these phone calls, said that he had stolen a car. 210 The prose-
cution then called the police detective who had interviewed the defen-
dant's cousin. 211 The detective testified, over objection, that the
cousin had said that the defendant had bragged to him about stealing
a car.2 12 The trial court instructed the jury to consider the portion of
the testimony about the phone calls only to assess the credibility of the
defendant's cousin. 213 On appeal, the defendant argued that the
State had improperly used his cousin's prior inconsistent statement.21 4
203. 333 Md. 593, 636 A.2d 999 (1994).
204. Id. at 604, 636 A.2d at 1005.
205. Id. at 596, 636 A.2d at 1001.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 597, 636 A.2d at 1001.
209. Id. (quoting the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals).
210. Id. (quoting the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals).
211. Id. (quoting the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals).
212. Id. (quoting the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals).
213. Id. (quoting the unreported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals).
214. See id. at 598-99, 636 A.2d at 1002. The State had called the defendant's cousin to
the witness stand merely to establish that he was, in fact, the defendant's cousin, that his
phone number matched the number on the victim's car phone bill, and that the defen-
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Judge Chasanow began his analysis by examining the Court of
Appeals's opinion in Spence v. State.21 5 In Spence, the State had asked
the trial judge to call a witness whom the prosecution knew would
exculpate the defendant on the stand.2 16 The prosecution admitted
that its reason for calling the witness was to introduce the witness's
prior out-of-court statements to police officers, in which the witness
had implicated the defendant in a burglary and robbery.2 17 On the
stand, the witness denied telling police that the defendant was one of
the men involved in the incident.218 The prosecution then called a
police detective who testified, over objection, that the witness had told
him that the defendant had participated in the crimes.2 1 9
The Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution's argument that
the witness's out-of-court statement to police was admissible for im-
peachment of the witness's in-court testimony.220  The court
explained:
It is obvious that the prosecutor's sole reason for prevailing
on the court to call [the] court's witness was to get before
the jury [the witness's] extrajudicial hearsay statement impli-
cating [the defendant]. The prosecutor knew that [the wit-
ness's] testimony would be exculpatory as to [the
defendant]. The inescapable conclusion is that the State,
over objection, prevailed on the court to call a witness who
would contribute nothing to the State's case, for the sole
purpose of "impeaching" the witness with otherwise inadmis-
sible hearsay.
dant had spoken with him from the car phone. Id. at 601, 636 A.2d at 1003. The defen-
dant argued, and the court ultimately agreed, that after the State had the defendant's
cousin verify all of the above information on the witness stand, "it was improper for the
State to inquire about the contents of the telephone conversation for the sole purpose of
impeaching [the cousin] regarding the entirely separate matter of whether or not the de-
fendant bragged about the crime in the telephone call." Id. According to the court, the
State undoubtedly knew that the defendant's cousin would deny hearing the confession
over the phone, but still proceeded to question him regarding the alleged confession. Id.
215. 321 Md. 526, 583 A.2d 715 (1991); see Bradley, 333 Md. at 599-600, 636 A.2d at 1002.
216. See Spence, 321 Md. at 528-29, 583 A.2d at 716.
217. Id. at 528, 583 A.2d at 716.
218. Id. at 529, 583 A.2d at 717.
219. Id. at 529-30, 583 A.2d at 717.
220. See id. at 531-32, 583 A.2d at 717-18 (recognizing that "impeachment by prior in-
consistent statement may not be permitted where employed as a mere subterfuge to get
before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible" (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting United States v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191, 1192. (7th Cir. 1984), quoting in turn
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975))).
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... This blatant attempt to circumvent the hearsay rule
and parade inadmissible evidence before the jury is not
permissible. 221
In Bradley, Judge Chasanow expanded on the Spence decision by
recognizing that a defendant in a criminal case "is denied a fair trial if
the State, with full knowledge that its questions will contribute noth-
ing to its case, questions a witness concerning an independent area of
inquiry in order to open the door for impeachment and introduce a
prior inconsistent statement. ' 222 The State had attempted to distin-
guish the circumstances in Bradley from those in Spence, arguing that
because its witness's testimony contributed to its case-that is, the wit-
ness was not called for the sole reason of introducing the witness's
prior inconsistent statements-the witness was called for a proper pur-
pose, and Spence was not violated.223 Judge Chasanow disagreed, rea-
soning that the Spence rationale also applied to the circumstances in
Bradley, which Chasanow referred to as an "'independent area of in-
quiry"' case.2 24 As he explained, the prosecution called the defen-
dant's cousin to testify (1) that his phone number matched the
number found on the victim's car phone bill, and (2) that the defen-
dant had called his cousin shortly after the robbery took place.225 The
State should not have been permitted to then question the cousin
about the contents of the conversation between him and the defendant
in order to impeach the cousin with the "entirely separate matter of
whether or not the defendant [had] bragged about the crime in the
telephone call." 226 Judge Chasanow determined that "we are led to
the 'inescapable conclusion ... that the State, over objection, [ques-
tioned a witness concerning an independent area of inquiry, knowing
it] would contribute nothing to the State's case, for the sole purpose
of "impeaching" the witness with otherwise inadmissible hearsay.' ,227
Judge Chasanow acknowledged that other courts had not drawn
the "independent area of inquiry" distinction, and instead focused on
whether the primary purpose in calling the witness was "to elicit sub-
221. Id. at 530, 583 A.2d at 717.
222. Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 604, 636 A.2d 999, 1005 (1994).
223. Id. at 601, 636 A.2d at 1003. The State argued that the cousin's value as a witness
had not been as a method by which to introduce his prior statement; rather, the cousin's
testimony had provided valuable evidence that demonstrated that the defendant was in the
car after it was stolen and that the defendant had called his cousin from the stolen car. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 601-02, 636 A.2d at 1003 (alteration in Bradley) (quoting Spence v. State, 321
Md. 526, 530, 583 A.2d 715, 717 (1991)).
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stantive testimony" or to introduce otherwise inadmissible hearsay
under the guise of impeachment. 228 Nonetheless, he pointed out that
the rationale behind these "primary purpose" cases was the same as
that behind the Bradley "independent area of inquiry" rationale-that
is, that the prosecution should not be permitted to engage in a subter-
fuge to circumvent the hearsay rule by presenting testimony in the
name of impeachment. 229 As Judge Chasanow poetically put it:
Impeachment may be thought of as a shield; it protects a
party from unfavorable testimony by neutralizing that testi-
mony. Impeachment should not be used as a sword to place
otherwise inadmissible evidence before the jury when there
is no reason whatsoever for eliciting the unfavorable testi-
mony upon which the need for impeachment is
predicated.230
Judge Chasanow also acknowledged, however, that the Bradley
holding-"that it is impermissible for a party in a criminal case over
objection, to venture into an independent area of inquiry" solely to
impeach a witness with otherwise inadmissible evidence 231 -was lim-
ited. 23 2 The Bradley holding does not apply, Judge Chasanow ex-
plained, where there is no clearly independent area of inquiry, and in
such a case, the State may impeach any portion of the witness's testi-
mony that disfavors its case.2 3 In addition, the State is not precluded
from inquiring into a possibly independent area of inquiry where a
failure to do so "could create a gap in the witness's testimony such
228. Id. at 602, 636 A.2d at 1004. The Bradley court identified numerous cases that have
evaluated the State's "primary purpose" in calling a witness. See id. at 602-03, 636 A.2d at
1004 (citing United States v. Gomez-Gallardo, 915 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[W]e are
compelled to conclude that the government called Gutierrez for the primary purpose of
impeaching Gutierrez's credibility to prove the substance of the charges against Gal-
lardo."); United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The prosecution ...
may not call a witness it knows to be hostile for the primary purpose of eliciting otherwise
inadmissible impeachment testimony, for such a scheme merely serves as a subterfuge to
avoid the hearsay rule."), corrected in part, 771 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975) ("The overwhelming weight of authority is...
that impeachment by prior inconsistent statement may not be permitted where employed
as a mere subterfuge to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible.")).
229. See id. at 603-04, 636 A.2d at 1004-05 (explaining why the rationale behind the
"primary purpose" cases should apply to Bradley); see also id. at 603, 636 A.2d at 1004 (rec-
ognizing that "the polic[y] underlying the 'primary purpose' and 'mere subterfuge' cases is
the concern that the government should not be permitted, 'in the name of impeachment,
to present testimony to the jury by indirection which would not otherwise be admissible'"
(quoting Morlang, 531 F.2d at 189)).
230. Id. at 605-06, 636 A.2d at 1005 (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 602, 636 A.2d at 1003.
232. Id. at 604, 636 A.2d at 1005.
233. Id.
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that a negative inference may arise against the prosecution. 2 34 The
State may also continue to impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent
statement "if the witness's testimony comes as a surprise" to the
State2 35 and "where the State is not responsible for a witness's 'blurt'
that harms its case. 236
In Bradley, Judge Chasanow extended the applicability of the orig-
inal "anti-subterfuge" rule that had been applied by the federal
courts2 37 and by the Court of Appeals in Spence.238 The rule applies to
situations in which the prosecution, knowing a witness will repudiate a
prior statement on the stand, calls that witness for the primary pur-
pose of introducing the prior inconsistent statement ostensibly to im-
peach the witness.239 Judge Chasanow expanded the rule to apply to
situations in which the prosecution questions a witness concerning an
independent area of inquiry for the purpose of introducing a prior
inconsistent statement for impeachment, even though no other court
had recognized such a distinction. 240 Judge Chasanow's analysis is not
inconsistent with these other courts, however, because his recognition
of the additional circumstances under which the rule applies main-
tains the protection against the prosecution's misuse of evidence with
which the original rule was concerned. 24' By preventing the State
234. Id. at 606, 636 A.2d at 1006.
235. See id. (noting that if the State called a witness expecting him to give favorable
testimony, but instead, the witness gave unfavorable testimony, then the State would be
entitled to impeach that witness).
236. Id. at 607, 636 A.2d at 1006; see id. (noting that prior inconsistent statements are
permissible impeachment evidence so long as the State did not "create the need to
impeach").
237. See supra note 228 (noting three anti-subterfuge cases cited by Judge Chasanow in
Bradley).
238. Spence v. State, 321 Md. 526, 530, 583 A.2d 715, 717 (1991) (finding that "[t]he
State cannot, over objection, have a witness called who it knows will contribute nothing to
its case, as a subterfuge to admit, as impeaching evidence, otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence").
239. See id.
240. See Bradley, 333 Md. at 602, 636 A.2d at 1004. Emphasizing that there is no case law
recognizing the "independent-area-of-inquiry distinction," the State argued that the Bradley
court should not adopt such a standard. See id. at 601-02, 636 A.2d at 1003-04. Judge
Chasanow rejected the State's argument, noting that although other courts have not for-
mally recognized the "independent-area-of-inquiry distinction," other courts do "look to
whether the witness was called to elicit substantive evidence or whether the 'primary pur-
pose' in calling the witness was to place otherwise inadmissible hearsay before the jury
through impeachment." Id. at 602, 636 A.2d at 1004 (citing United States v. Gomez-Gal-
lardo, 915 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1975)); see supra note 228 (noting the
language of these cases relied upon by Judge Chasanow).
241. Judge Chasanow stated that "[i]n Spence, we made clear that 'blatant attempt[s] to
circumvent the hearsay rule and parade inadmissible hearsay before the jury' should not
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from questioning a witness concerning an independent area of in-
quiry in order to introduce an otherwise inadmissible prior inconsis-
tent statement through impeachment, Judge Chasanow also protected
against the possibility that ajury could misuse such a statement as sub-
stantive evidence.
Different considerations are involved, however, where a witness's
prior inconsistent statement is introduced as substantive evidence. As
a result, a prior inconsistent statement admissible for its truth will be
admissible regardless of whether the party calling the witness is aware
beforehand that the witness will repudiate the prior statement, pro-
vided that the statement meets certain requirements.
In Stewart v. State,2 42 Judge Chasanow differentiated between the
use of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment and the intro-
duction of such a statement as substantive evidence.2 4 The question
in Stewart was whether a witness's prior inconsistent statement could
be admitted as substantive evidence in a criminal trial, even though
the party calling the witness knew beforehand that the witness in-
tended to recant his prior statement on the stand.2 4 4 Michael Stewart
had been convicted of murder and use of a handgun in the commis-
sion of a crime of violence. 2" 5 George Booth had been present at the
scene of the crime immediately before the shooting and subsequently
identified Stewart from an array of photographs, presented to him by
police, as the person who shot the victim. 24 6 About three-and-a-half
months after the shooting, Booth identified the defendant from a
photo array, writing on the back of the defendant's photograph: "I'm
positive that he was the one that shot [the victim]."247 Booth also ap-
be sanctioned." Bradley, 333 Md. at 603, 636 A.2d at 1004 (second alteration in original)
(citing Spence, 321 Md. at 530, 583 A.2d at 717). He then concluded that there is
no reason to distinguish between the State requesting that a court's witness be
called as a way to get inadmissible hearsay before the trier of fact (i.e., Spence), and
the State questioning its own witness, in an independent area of inquiry, in order
to get inadmissible hearsay before the trier of fact (i.e., the instant case).
Id. at 604, 636 A.2d at 1004-05.
242. 342 Md. 230, 674 A.2d 944 (1996).
243. See id. at 236, 674 A.2d at 947.
244. Id. at 233, 674 A.2d at 946.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 233-34, 674 A.2d at 946. Booth was a key witness for the State. See id. at 234,
674 A.2d at 946. On the day of the shooting, Booth gave two statements to the police. Id.
Booth first told police that he had seen neither the shooting nor the person who had
murdered the victim. Id. In a second statement given later that same day, however, Booth
said he had seen "a man wearing blue shorts and a sweat jacket" running from the murder
scene just after the shooting. Id.
247. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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peared that same day before a grand jury, where he testified that Stew-
art had shot the victim. 248
At a later pre-trial motions hearing, however, Booth gave testi-
mony that was inconsistent with his grand jury testimony, stating that
he had initially selected another person's photograph from the photo
array but was pressured by the police into identifying Stewart as the
shooter.249 Similarly, when he was called as the State's witness at Stew-
art's trial, Booth testified that he did not know the person who had
shot the victim and that he had never seen the killer before.25 ° He
also denied identifying the defendant as the killer from the police
photo array and stated that he had initially selected someone else's
photograph, but had signed his name and had written on the back of
the defendant's photograph because the police had "hounded" him
into doing so.2 51 The trial court then admitted in evidence the photo-
graph of the defendant containing Booth's statement that the defen-
dant was the shooter.252
Still under direct examination, however, Booth acknowledged
testifying before the grand jury that the defendant was the person who
had shot the victim, and he also stated that his testimony before the
grand jury had been truthful.25  On cross-examination by the de-
fense, he "recanted again and testified that [the defendant] was not
the shooter. '254 The court then admitted Booth's grand jury testi-
mony in evidence.25
On appeal, Stewart argued that neither the witness's out-of-court
statements identifying the defendant as the shooter nor the witness's
grand jury testimony should have been admitted because the prosecu-
tion's only purpose in calling Booth was to have the inculpatory out-
of-court statements admitted in evidence.256 Judge Chasanow began
248. Id. Booth later told prosecutors that he had "no intention" of testifying at Stewart's
trial. Id. at 234-35, 674 A.2d at 946. After failing to appear at the initial trial date, a bench
warrant was issued and Booth was forced to appear. Id, at 235, 674 A.2d at 946.
249. Id. at 235, 674 A.2d at 946-47.
250. Id., 674 A.2d at 947.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. Both of Booth's statements to police on July 9, 1993, the day of the shooting,
were also admitted in evidence without objection. Id
256. Id. at 236, 674 A.2d at 947. Appealing his conviction to the Court of Special Ap-
peals, the defendant argued that the admission of Booth's grand jury testimony and out-of-
court statements was improper because the "State's only purpose in calling Booth as a
witness was to have his previous out-of-court statements implicating [the defendant] in the
shooting admitted into evidence." Id The Court of Special Appeals rejected the defen-
dant's argument and affirmed his conviction. Id
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his analysis by stating the traditional evidence rule that a witness's
prior statements, when inconsistent with his in-court testimony, are
admissible to impeach the witness's credibility, but when they are of-
fered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statements," the
statements are hearsay and thus inadmissible as substantive evi-
dence. 257 He explained, however, that the Court of Appeals had out-
lined an exception to this general rule in Nance v. State,2 58 which
permitted the admission of a witness's prior statement as substantive
evidence at trial if:
(1) the out-of-court statement is inconsistent with the wit-
ness's in-court testimony; (2) the prior statement is based on
the declarant's own knowledge; (3) the prior statement is re-
duced to writing and signed or otherwise adopted by the wit-
ness; and (4) the witness is subject to cross-examination at
the trial where the out-of-court statement is introduced.259
The Stewart court also noted that inconsistent grand jury testi-
mony is admissible at a later trial if the witness is available for cross-
examination.26 ° Judge Chasanow explained that these common law
principles had been codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence by
Maryland Rule 5-802.1,261 but he observed that the use of prior writ-
257. Id. The Maryland Rules define "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted." MD. R. 5-801(c).
258. 331 Md. 549, 629 A.2d 633 (1993).
259. Stewart, 342 Md. at 237, 674 A.2d at 947-48 (footnote omitted) (citing Nance, 331
Md. at 569, 629 A.2d at 643). Prior to the Stewart decision, the court had discussed the
validity of Nance in light of Bradley v. State, 333 Md. 593, 636 A.2d 99 (1994). See Stewart, 342
Md. at 241-44, 674 A.2d at 950-51. The Bradley court thought it important to make clear
that its holding was not inconsistent with Nance. See Bradley, 333 Md. at 607, 636 A.2d at
1006. Judge Chasanow emphasized that the holding in Bradley did not affect Nance because
Bradley addressed solely impeachment evidence and not evidence admissible substantively.
See id. The evidence in Bradley was admissible only for impeachment because the witness's
prior statement had not been reduced to writing and signed; therefore, it did not comply
with the requirements for admissibility as substantive evidence as set forth in Nance. See id.
260. Stewart, 342 Md. at 237-38, 674 A.2d at 948 (citing Nance, 331 Md. at 571, 629 A.2d
at 644).
261. Id. at 238, 674 A.2d at 948. Rule 5-802.1 provides in relevant part:
The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at the trial or
hearing and who is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement are not
excluded by the hearsay rule:
(a) A statement that is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, if the
statement was
(1) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding or in a deposition; (2) reduced to writing and signed by the
declarant; or (3) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or
electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement ....
Mn. R. 5-802.1(a).
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ten statements had been somewhat restricted by requiring such a
statement to be signed by the witness, eliminating the ability of a party
to introduce a prior written statement "otherwise adopted" by the wit-
ness. 26 2 Chasanow noted that although Rule 5-802.1 was not in effect
at the time of Stewart's trial, the court's holding would be the same
under that Rule.263
Although Booth's prior inconsistent statements met the require-
ments of Nance (and Rule 5-802.1) and were therefore admissible as
substantive evidence,264 the defense argued that the prosecution was
required to have a purpose for calling Booth other than merely to
introduce his prior statements in evidence. 265 The defense also ar-
gued that because the prosecution had known before it had called
Booth that he would repudiate his out-of-court statements on the
stand, the prosecution should not have been allowed to call the wit-
ness solely for the purpose of introducing his prior statements. 266 The
defense relied on the Spence/Bradley rationale, but Judge Chasanow
pointed out that those rules apply "when a witness's prior inconsistent
statements are admitted only for purposes of impeachment, not as sub-
stantive evidence. '267 Judge Chasanow analyzed the reasons why prior
inconsistent statements offered as substantive evidence are treated dif-
ferently from prior inconsistent statements offered solely for impeach-
ment.268 As he explained, the purpose of evidence admitted only for
impeachment is to attack the credibility of a witness in an attempt to
neutralize the witness's testimony;269 in other words, its only purpose
is to negate previous testimony. Thus, if the prosecution learns in ad-
vance that a witness intends to repudiate a prior statement at trial, it
should merely refrain from calling the witness to the stand and "avoid
the need to neutralize the witness's testimony."270 Judge Chasanow
reasoned that the "evil" implicated in Spence and Bradley was the jury's
262. Stewart, 342 Md. at 237 n.2, 674 A.2d at 948 n.2.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 239-40, 674 A.2d at 949. Booth's grand jury testimony was given under oath
and "transcribed verbatim," and he was available to be cross-examined at trial. Id. at 239,
674 A.2d at 949.
265. Id. at 240, 674 A.2d at 949.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 242, 674 A.2d at 950; see also supra notes 200-227 and accompanying text
(discussing this distinction).
268. See Stewart, 342 Md. at 242-43, 674 A.2d at 950 ("The admission of prior inconsis-
tent statements for impeachment creates the danger that the jury will misuse the state-
ments as substantive evidence, despite instructions to the contrary. This danger does not
exist where, as here, the prior statements are admitted as substantive evidence of guilt.").
269. See id. at 242, 674 A.2d at 950.
270. Id.
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misuse of impeachment testimony as substantive evidence because, no
matter how incriminating, evidence admitted only for impeachment is
not substantive evidence of guilt and will not support a conviction.27 '
Such a danger does not exist, however, when a prior inconsistent
statement is initially offered as substantive evidence, because in such
circumstances, the jury is permitted to consider the statement as evi-
dence of guilt.272 As a result, Judge Chasanow concluded that the pre-
requisite that "the State be surprised by a recanting witness's
testimony before inconsistent out-of-court statements can be admitted
to impeach the witness ' 2 73 had no applicability where a prior inconsis-
tent statement is "'openly offered and received as flat-out substantive
evidence of guilt.' "274
Judge Chasanow's thoughtful analysis in Stewart is consistent with
the underlying policies of the Spence/Bradley restriction on the use of
prior inconsistent statements for impeachment. The major concern
underlying the restriction is that the jury may misuse impeachment
evidence as substantive evidence, for which the evidence would be
inadmissible. 275 When evidence is substantively admissible in the first
instance, however, there is no potential for misuse from which to "pro-
tect" the jury. In addition, the State need not engage in the type of
"subterfuge" utilized in Spence and Bradley in order to admit the state-
ment. The issue of concern regarding the admission of a prior incon-
sistent statement as substantive evidence is, thus, not the jury's misuse
of such evidence or the possibility of State subterfuge, but is instead
the right of the defendant to cross-examine the witness concerning
the statement. This concern is satisfied, however, under the require-
ments of Nance and Maryland Rule 5-802.1, which hold that the wit-
ness must be available for cross-examination before a prior
inconsistent statement will be admissible as substantive evidence.
27 6
The Stewart opinion also revealed Judge Chasanow's deference to
the plain language of the codified evidence Rules when the Rules are
inconsistent with prior common law. As he indicated, Rule 5-802.1
modified and restricted the common law Nance rule by denying the
admission of a witness's prior inconsistent written statement that was
271. Id.
272. Id. at 242-43, 674 A.2d at 950.
273. Id. at 243, 674 A.2d at 951.
274. Id. (quoting Stewart v. State, 104 Md. App. 273, 279, 655 A.2d 1345, 1350 (1995)).
275. See supra notes 268-274 (explaining the dangers that can arise when the prior in-
consistent statement exception to the hearsay rule is used to elicit otherwise inadmissible
evidence).
276. See supra notes 260-263 and accompanying text.
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unsigned but "otherwise adopted" by the witness. 7 7 This approach is
nonetheless consistent with Maryland Rule 1-201, which provides that
the Maryland Rules do not supercede prior common law unless incon-
sistent with the Rules.278
E. Impeachment of Character Witnesses with Evidence of the Defendant's
Criminal History
At the heart of Judge Chasanow's Stewart opinion is his recogni-
tion of the importance of the purpose for which evidence is intro-
duced. In Stewart, the question concerned the admissibility of prior
inconsistent statements for impeachment or substantive purposes. 279
An analytically similar problem was presented in State v. Watson,28 ° in
which Judge Chasanow addressed the propriety of cross-examining a
defendant's character witness with questions concerning the defen-
dant's prior crimes. "It is a basic principle of our legal system, requir-
ing no citation of authority, that the State may not offer, as proof of
guilt, evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character and,
therefore, likely to commit the offense charged. 281 A defendant, on
the other hand, is permitted to introduce evidence of his or her good
character to suggest that it is unlikely that someone of such good char-
acter would commit a crime.28 2 Should a defendant exercise this op-
tion, however, the prosecution may then introduce rebuttal evidence
"to establish the defendant's bad character for the same trait. ' 283 In
addition, the State is also permitted to question a defendant's charac-
ter witness about the witness's knowledge of other crimes or offenses
committed by the defendant and relevant to the character trait to
277. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
278. MD. R. 5-102; see also supra text accompanying note 17 (setting forth the relevant
language of the Rule).
279. Stewart, 342 Md. at 233, 674 A.2d at 946.
280. 321 Md. 47, 580 A.2d 1067 (1990).
281. Id. at 52, 580 A.2d at 1069; see also MD. R. 5-404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... ").
282. Watson, 321 Md. at 52, 580 A.2d at 1069; see also MD. R. 5-404(a) (1) (A) (providing
an exception to the general rule that character may not be used to prove conduct and
stating that evidence of a pertinent character trait of an accused is admissible if offered by
the accused).
283. Watson, 321 Md. at 52, 580 A.2d at 1069; see also MD. R. 5-404(a)(1)(A) (providing
that if an accused introduces evidence that he possesses a pertinent character trait, the
prosecution may introduce rebuttal evidence). This Rule may be viewed as a specific appli-
cation of the doctrine of opening the door, since by introducing evidence of his good
character, the defendant "opens the door" to that character, which then permits the State
to provide rebuttal evidence of the defendant's character that would otherwise be
inadmissible.
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which the witness testified in order to test the witness's knowledge or
the validity of the witness's opinion.2 84 Using other-crimes evidence
still creates the potential for substantial prejudice.28 5 Quoting the Su-
preme Court in Michelson v. United States,286 Judge Chasanow ex-
plained that "merely asking questions suggesting past criminal acts
committed by an accused may 'waft an unwarranted innuendo into
the jury box.' ,287
In Watson, the defendant, who had been charged with first-degree
murder, called character witnesses who testified about their opinions
regarding his peaceful and nonviolent character.28  Although the
court prohibited the State from cross-examining the defendant about
his prior conviction for second-degree rape,289 the State was permit-
ted to ask the character witnesses whether they were aware of the de-
fendant's prior conviction to test the basis for the witnesses' opinions
that the defendant had a peaceful and nonviolent character. 290 The
defense objected to the use of the rape conviction because the convic-
tion was for the statutory rape of a consenting thirteen-year-old girl
and did not involve force.29
284. Watson, 321 Md. at 52-53, 580 A.2d at 1069-70. Judge Chasanow explained that a
character witness's testimony as to a defendant's good character is weakened if the witness
was not aware of relevant criminal acts of the defendant. Id. at 53, 580 A.2d at 1069. In
addition, if the witness was aware of the prior crimes and adheres to an opinion that the
defendant is of good character, the soundness of his or her opinion may be undermined.
Id., 580 A.2d at 1069-70. This use of evidence of a defendant's other crimes is consistent
with the rule that such evidence may not be introduced to prove the defendant's guilt
because the evidence is being used to impeach the character witness rather than as sub-
stantive evidence against the accused.
285. Id. at 53, 580 A.2d at 1070.
286. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
287. Watson, 321 Md. at 53, 580 A.2d at 1070 (quoting Michelson, 335 U.S. at 481). In
Michelson, the Supreme Court explained that an inquiry into a defendant's past crimes "is
not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much
with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record
and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge." Michelson, 335 U.S.
at 475-76 (footnote omitted).
288. Watson, 321 Md. at 50, 580 A.2d at 1068.
289. Id. Chasanow explained that the trial court had properly prohibited cross-examina-
tion of the defendant regarding this conviction because the offense "was not a common
law felony, crimen falsi, or lesser crime bearing on credibility and, therefore, could not be
used to impeach [the defendant's] credibility." Id. The requirements for using prior
crimes to impeach credibility have since been codified in Maryland Rule 5-609.
290. Id. In response to the State's question, most of the witnesses testified that they were
aware of the defendant's conviction but that it had no effect on their opinions. Id. at 50-
51, 580 A.2d at 1068.
291. Id. at 51, 580 A.2d at 1068-69. The court acknowledged, by citing the record of the
second-degree rape conviction proffered by the State, that
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Judge Chasanow emphasized that inappropriate cross-examina-
tion of a character witness may be highly prejudicial, and trial judges
should be careful to allow cross-examination only about criminal acts
clearly relevant to the character traits testified to on direct examina-
tion.292 Chasanow also noted that while a cross-examiner is generally
limited to the name of the crime, the time and place of conviction,
and the punishment when inquiring about prior convictions,293
"[t]here may, however, be instances where the name of the crime
does not indicate its nature or where, as in the instant case, the name
of the crime may even be misleading."
29 4
Judge Chasanow explained that in order to admit evidence of a
defendant's prior crime to impeach character testimony, the evidence
must impugn the good character trait testified to by the character wit-
ness.295 Although most acts of second-degree rape would be relevant
to rebut the assertion that the defendant is a peaceful and nonviolent
man, 296 Chasanow concluded that the crime of second-degree rape,
based on the defendant's unforced sexual intercourse with a con-
senting thirteen-year-old girl, had little relationship to the defendant's
peacefulness and nonviolence, and was thus irrelevant for purposes of
impeachment. 297 In addition, any minimal probative value of the con-
viction was substantially outweighed by the probability that the jury
would "misunderstand the nature of the conviction and misuse the
evidence." '298 As Chasanow explained:
[t]his [argument] was supported by the record of the second-degree rape convic-
tion proffered by the State which included a pre-sentence investigation contain-
ing the following "Description of Present Offense":
"The victim who is thirteen years old states that she and the defendant en-
gaged in vaginal intercourse on more than one occasion, but was never
forced to do so. Further the victim stated that she was in love with the
accused."
Id., 580 A.2d at 1069.
292. Id. at 53, 580 A.2d at 1070.
293. Id. at 54, 580 A.2d at 1070 (citing MCCORMICK, supra note 36, at 127); Foster v.
State, 304 Md. 439, 469-70, 499 A.2d 1236, 1251-52 (1985)).
294. Id. at 55, 580 A.2d at 1070. Chasanow explained, by example, that the crime of
"second-degree rape" can include sexual intercourse by force and without the consent of
the victim. Id., 580 A.2d at 1070-71. However, the second-degree rape of which the defen-
dant had previously been convicted did not require that sexual intercourse be accom-
plished by force or without the victim's consent. Id., 580 A.2d at 1071. In fact, the victim
herself testified that she was never forced to engage in sexual intercourse but did so will-
ingly because she was in love with the defendant. Id. at 51, 580 A.2d at 1069.
295. Id. at 55, 580 A.2d at 1071.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 56, 580 A.2d at 1071.
298. Id.
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Rape in any degree without further explanation commonly
would be perceived as a vicious, violent, brutal sexual act.
[The defendant's] criminal act, though reprehensible, did
not involve any element of force and violence. Its probative
value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the potential
prejudice of the jury misunderstanding the nature of the
crime [the defendant] committed, as well as the potential
prejudice of the jury improperly drawing the inference that
anyone who commits a brutal, vicious, violent crime like rape
might be likely to commit a brutal, vicious, violent
murder.2 99
Judge Chasanow also rejected the State's argument that a limiting
instruction given by the trial court, directing the jury to use the evi-
dence of the defendant's rape conviction only for evaluating the char-
acter witnesses' knowledge of the defendant, rendered the admission
of the evidence harmless. 30 0 He explained that such an instruction is
intended to mitigate prejudice when a jury is appropriately exposed to
evidence of prior crimes, whereas in the instant case, the jury never
should have been exposed to the prior conviction.0 1
F. Hearsay
1. State v. Harrell and the Excited Utterance Exception.-Given
Judge Chasanow's expressed preference for uniformity between the
Federal Rules of Evidence and Title 5 of the Maryland Rules, his opin-
ion in State v. Harrell'° 2 is something of a puzzlement. The question in
Harrell was the admissibility, under the excited utterance exception to
the hearsay rule,... of an out-of-court statement the defendant's girl-
friend made immediately after she had been battered by the defen-
dant." 4 The statement addressed not only the battery, but the
defendant's alleged theft of an automobile.
3 0 5
At Harrell's trial for battery and theft of a vehicle, the arresting
police officer testified that he had seen the defendant kicking the vic-
299. Id. at 57, 580 A.2d at 1071-72.
300. Id. at 58, 580 A.2d at 1072.
301. Id.
302. 348 Md. 69, 702 A.2d 723 (1997).
303. Maryland Rule 5-803(b) (2) defines an "excited utterance" as "[a] statement relat-
ing to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of
excitement caused by the event or condition." MD. R. 5-803(b) (2). Excited utterances are
not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant may be available as a witness.
MD. R. 5-803.
304. See Harrell 348 Md. at 73-74, 702 A.2d at 725-26 (reciting the facts leading up to the
out-of-court statement).
305. Id. at 74-75, 702 A.2d at 726.
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tim, who was on the ground.3" 6 According to the officer, the defen-
dant fled but was soon apprehended."0 7 The officer testified that
within two minutes of the beating, he interviewed the victim, who had
minor cuts and bruises3"' and was "crying and appeared very emo-
tional and upset."30 9  The victim-Harrell's girlfriend-reportedly
told the officer that the defendant "beat me up and he stole that car
there."3 ' The trial court admitted the statement as an excited utter-
ance, and the defendant was convicted, although, according to the
trial judge, "the only link to these offenses... [was] the excited utter-
ance testimony of the girlfriend."3 1 1 In an unreported opinion, the
Court of Special Appeals affirmed the defendant's battery conviction,
but reversed the theft conviction and remanded it for a new trial.31 2
The State petitioned the Court of Appeals and the court granted
certiorari. 13
Writing for the court, Judge Chasanow held the statement inad-
missible insofar as it related to the theft of the automobile.3 1 4 Chasa-
now looked to the language of the excited utterance exception to the
rule against hearsay315 and explained that the statement at issue must
not only be made under the stress of the exciting event, but it must
also relate to that event.316 In Harrell, the starting event was the de-
fendant's battery of his girlfriend i.3 1  Thus, that part of the victim's
statement having to do with the theft of the car was inadmissible as
part of the excited utterance.318
306. Id. at 73, 702 A.2d at 725.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 74, 702 A.2d at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted).
310. Id., 702 A.2d at 726 (internal quotation marks omitted). The officer was sum-
moned to the scene to respond to the alleged domestic violence. See id. at 73, 702 A.2d at
725. Upon the officer's arrival, the victim indicated that the defendant had picked her up
earlier in the evening in a 1984 Chevrolet Monte Carlo, which the defendant allegedly
claimed to have stolen. Id. at 74-75, 702 A.2d at 726. The officer checked the license plate
number and learned that the car had been reported stolen during the previous month. Id.
at 75, 702 A.2d at 726. As a result, the defendant was arrested on charges of battery and
theft over $300. Id.
311. Id. at 75, 702 A.2d at 726.
312. Id. at 76, 702 A.2d at 726-27.
313. Id, 702 A.2d at 727.
314. Id. at 83, 702 A.2d at 730.
315. See supra note 303 (quoting the excited utterance exception).
316. Harrelt 348 Md. at 80, 702 A.2d at 728-29.
317. Id. at 82, 702 A.2d at 730.
318. Id. at 83, 702 A.2d at 730; see id. at 82-83, 702 A.2d at 730 (distinguishing between
the victim's "conscious reflection" and "spontaneous reaction" and indicating that only the
latter falls under the excited utterance exception).
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The prosecution argued that "relating," as used in the Rule,
should be interpreted broadly, and supported this by citing the analo-
gous Federal Rule and the advisory committee's notes,3 1 9 as well as
cases from other jurisdictions.120 According to Judge Chasanow, how-
ever, if the declarant's statement is unconnected to the exciting event,
the likelihood of reflection and fabrication increases, and the trust-
worthiness of the statement is no longer sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirements of a hearsay exception. 21  The State also urged that the
two components of the statement-those mentioning the battery and
the car theft-were so inextricably intertwined with the circumstances
under which they were made that the trustworthiness of the former
carried over to the latter.122 Judge Chasanow rejected this argument
as well, on essentially the same basis as the earlier argument: because
the two components of the statement were insufficiently connected to
each other, the statement about the car theft might have been the
result of reflection or animus caused by the battery.123
Not long before Harreli, the Court of Appeals considered and re-
jected a similar argument applied to the statement against penal inter-
est exception to the hearsay rule.324 In State v. Matusky,3 25 a declarant
told his fiancee that he had driven the defendant to a murder scene
and had waited in the car while Michael Matusky, the defendant,
killed two women.3 26 Thus, the statements that explained the declar-
ant's involvement in the crime were self-inculpatory because they im-
319. Id. at 80-81, 702 A.2d at 729 (citing Federal Rule of Evidence 803 and the advisory
committee's note, which states that, in the excited utterance exception, "the statement
need only 'relate' to the startling event or condition, thus affording a broader scope of
subject matter coverage").
320. See id. at 81, 702 A.2d at 729 (citing Hawaii v. Zukevich, 932 P.2d 340, 345 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1997), and Utah v. Kinross, 906 P.2d 320, 324 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), as liberally inter-
preting the term "relating," as is done in the Federal Rules).
321. Id. at 81-82, 702 A.2d at 729.
322. See id. at 82, 702 A.2d at 730.
323. Id. at 82-83, 702 A.2d at 730.
324. The "statement against interest" exception is set forth in Maryland Rule 5-
804(b) (3). The Rule defines such a statement as:
A statement which was at the time of its making so contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, so tended to subject the declarant to civil or
criminal liability, or so tended to render invalid a claim by the declarant against
another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have
made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. A statement tending
to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused
is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustwor-
thiness of the statement.
MD. R. 5-804(b) (3).
325. 343 Md. 467, 682 A.2d 694 (1996).
326. Id. at 472-74, 682 A.2d at 696-97.
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plicated the declarant as a criminal actor.327 The portions of the
statement implicating the defendant, however, were collateral to the
self-inculpatory aspects of the statement.328 The Court of Appeals, per
Judge Raker, held that admissibility was limited to the portion of the
statement that was individually self-inculpatory and that the extended
statement was not admissible in its entirety.3 29
Prior to the adoption of Title 5, Maryland recognized the admissi-
bility not only of statements against the interest of the declarant, but
also of collateral statements "so closely connected with [such state-
ments] as to be equally trustworthy."330 The Court of Appeals found
that the disputed statements in Matusky did not meet this standard. 1
Because Matusky's retrial would have been governed not by Mary-
land's common law of evidence but by Title 5, the Court of Appeals
went on to consider whether the common law standard had survived
adoption of the new Rules. 32 Relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Williamson v. United States,33 which had decided essentially the
same question under the analogous Federal Rule, 4 the Court of Ap-
peals further restricted the statement against penal interest exception,
limiting it to only those individual statements that "a reasonable per-
son in the declarant's circumstances would have believed [to be] ad-
verse to his or her penal interest at the time it was made."335
Collateral statements, no matter how inextricably intertwined with the
self inculpatory statements, were no longer to be admissible under the
exception. 6
In reaching its conclusion in Matusky, the Court of Appeals relied
not just on Williamson, but also on a string of federal cases interpreting
327. See id. at 485, 682 A.2d at 702-03.
328. Id, 682 A.2d at 703; see also id (explaining that "the trial court should have re-
dacted those portions of [the] declaration identifying Matusky as the murderer and sug-
gesting Matusky's motive for the crime").
329. Id. at 484-85, 682 A.2d at 702-03.
330. Id. at 482, 682 A.2d at 701 (emphasis omitted) (quoting State v. Standifur, 310 Md.
3, 17, 526 A.2d 955, 962 (1987)). Standifur was decided in 1987, six years before Maryland
adopted the Rules of Evidence. See supra note 27.
331. 343 Md. at 484-85, 682 A.2d at 702-03.
332. See id. at 486-92, 682 A.2d at 703-06.
333. 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
334. The issue in Williamson was the scope of the hearsay exception for statements
against penal interests, as codified in Federal Rule 804(b) (3). Id at 596. Rule 804(b) (3)
states that "[a] statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered
to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indi-
cate the trustworthiness of the statement." FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (3).
335. Matusky, 343 Md. at 492, 682 A.2d at 706.
336. Id. at 491, 682 A.2d at 705-06.
[VOL. 60:315
2001] HOWARD CHASANOW AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 361
the cognate Federal Rule.3 3 7 YetJudge Chasanow's opinion in Harrell,
which presented an analogous problem under the excited utterance
exception, relies almost exclusively on decisions of other state jurisdic-
tions.3" 8 It displays no interest in the interpretation given to the cog-
nate Federal Rule. Judge Chasanow's opinion in Harrell appears to
ignore the methodological approach recently applied in Matusky.
That in itself is remarkable. From a judge who claimed to be commit-
ted to some measure of uniformity between the Maryland and Federal
Rules, it is more than a bit puzzling.
2. The Adoption and Application of the Residual Hearsay Exception.-
Among the most contentious issues to arise during the consideration
of the Maryland Rules of Evidence was whether to include residual
exceptions to the hearsay rule, as had been done with the Federal
Rules. 9 The Maryland Evidence Rules Subcommittee declined to
follow the federal precedent in a closely divided vote.34 ° The full com-
mittee, also closely divided, could not muster the votes to reverse the
subcommittee's resolution of the question.3 4 ' The Court of Appeals
showed greater wisdom. Recognizing that there might be circum-
stances in which particularly trustworthy hearsay did not fit within one
337. See id. at 489-90, 682 A.2d at 704-05 (noting that the trial court must consider sur-
rounding circumstances to determine whether an individual statement is self incriminating
and citing United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Nagib, 56
F.3d 798, 804 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Canan, 48 F.3d 954, 959-60 (6th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Rothberg, 896 F. Supp. 450, 453 (E.D. Pa. 1995); United States v. Sims, 879 F.
Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1293,
1298-1300 (M.D. Pa. 1994)).
338. See State v. Harrell, 348 Md. 69, 79-81, 702 A.2d 723, 728-29 (1997) (citing case law
from Michigan, Washington, Colorado, Hawai'i, and Utah).
339. Howard S. Chasanow &Jose Felip6 Anderson, The Residual Hearsay Exceptions: Mary-
land's Lukewarm Welcome, 24 U. BAJ.T. L. REv. 1, 2 (1994); see also FED. R. EviD. 807 (the
residual exception to the hearsay rule). Maryland adopted its Rules of Evidence through
an extended process, whereby the Maryland Evidence Rules Subcommittee, which had
been established by the Court of Appeals, first studied Maryland's law of evidence and the
experiences of federal and state courts that had adopted rules modeled on the Federal
Rules. Next, the subcommittee used this information to propose a draft for the Maryland
Rules of Evidence. The subcommittee completed this task in 1992, after which the full
committee (the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure) discussed, modified, and
revised the subcommittee's proposed rules. The full committee prepared a report, propos-
ing Tide 5 of the Maryland Rules of Practice and Procedure. After a period of public
comment and a public hearing, the Court of Appeals voted to adopt Title 5. See Alan D.
Hornstein, The New Maryland Rules of Evidence: Analysis and Critique, 54 MD. L. REv. 1032,
1033-34 (1995).
340. Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 339, at 2 n.7; see also State v. Walker, 345 Md.
293, 317-18, 691 A.2d 1341, 1352-53 (discussing the history of the residual hearsay
exception).
341. Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 339, at 2 n.7; see also Walker, 345 Md. at 317-18,
691 A.2d at 1352-53.
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of the specifically enumerated exceptions to the rule against hearsay,
the court decided to include the residual exceptions in the Maryland
Rules.342 There is much to criticize in the federal residual exception,
but an extended exegesis of the exception is beyond the scope of this
Article. 43 Unfortunately, because no recommendation on the
residual exceptions had been forwarded to the court, the only model
before it was the language of the Federal Rules.
The only significant difference between the federal residual ex-
ception and the Maryland exceptions is the addition of the restrictive
language in the Maryland Rules, "under exceptional circum-
stances. '344 Despite Judge Chasanow's concern with the departures in
the Maryland Rules from the language of the Federal Rule, his opin-
ion on the adoption of the Maryland Rules failed to note these restric-
tions, presumably because he favored a more restrictive hearsay
exception than that provided by the Federal Rules, at least as inter-
preted. The residual exceptions to the hearsay rule provide that a
hearsay statement that does not meet the requirements of one of the
many enumerated exceptions may nonetheless be admissible if it pos-
sesses circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the
enumerated exceptions345 and if other prerequisites are met.346 As
might be expected, there is a fair degree of judicial disagreement
342. Walker, 345 Md. at 318, 691 A.2d at 1353; see also MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-
804(b) (5). The first residual exception, Rule 5-803(b)(24), which applies when the un-
availability of the declarant is not required, reads:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by the hearsay
rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: A statement not specifi-
cally covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes
of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in ad-
vance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to prepare to meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of
it, including the name and address of the declarant.
MD. R. 5-803(b)(24). The second residual exception, Rule 5-804(b)(5), is identical to 5-
803(b) (24) except that the word "available" is replaced by the word "unavailable" in the
first sentence of the exception. Compare MD. R. 803(b) (24), with MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
343. For a discussion of Maryland's residual exception, as found in Rules 5-803(b) (24)
and 5-804(b) (5), see Hornstein, supra note 339, at 1074-75.
344. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5); see infra note 347 and accompanying text.
345. See MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5); supra note 342 (setting forth the
residual exceptions).
346. For example, an adverse party must be given notice that a declarant intends to use
the hearsay exception. MD. R. 5-803(b) (24); MD. R. 5-804(b) (5).
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about how liberally or grudgingly the residual exceptions should be
interpreted.
Typically, the drafters expect that the exceptions will be rarely
applied, butjudges confronted with particular facts of particular cases
may use the exceptions more expansively than the drafters might have
envisioned. In an attempt to ensure that Maryland's residual excep-
tions would be more rigorously applied than their federal counter-
parts, the Court of Appeals approved a draft with the introductory
clause, "under exceptional circumstances. '347 As might be imagined,
there was some uncertainty within bench and bar concerning the
reach of the residual exceptions in the new Rules. The first clue was
provided by extrajudicial writing from Judge Chasanow, along with
Professor Anderson of the University of Baltimore School of Law. 4'
In their article, Chasanow and Anderson advocated codifying Mary-
land's evidence law based upon the federal model.349 Yet despite
Judge Chasanow's criticism of the Rules for less than complete fidelity
to the federal language, the authors spoke approvingly of Maryland's
more cautious approach to the residual exception: "The Maryland
version of the residual hearsay exceptions manifests appropriate cau-
tion in introducing the residual hearsay concept to the Maryland
courts." O5 And, in what would soon turn out to be an ironic predic-
tion, the authors noted that "[t]his should reduce the divergent and
inconsistent interpretations of the rule that have plagued the federal
courts."35 '
Not long after the appearance of this article, Judge Chasanow
urged a divergent and inconsistent interpretation of the Rule in his
dissent in State v. Walker.352 Walker had been convicted of robbery
with a deadly weapon.353 He had admitted to committing the robbery
and had discussed with his then-girlfriend important details that only
the perpetrator would be likely to know;354 Walker's girlfriend had
reported the conversation in detail to the police,3 55 apparently in an
347. MD. R. 5-803(b)(24); MD. R. 5-804(b)(5). In addition, the advisory committee's
note to Rule 5-803 states that "[i]t is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances." MD. R. 5-803(b)(24) advisory
committee's note.
348. See generally Chasanow & Anderson, supra note 339.
349. Cf. id. at 23 (noting Judge Chasanow's endorsement, with limited dissent, of the
decision to codify selected Federal Rules of Evidence in Maryland).
350. Id at 26.
351. Id.
352. 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997).
353. Id. at 295, 691 A.2d at 1342.
354. Id. at 296, 691 A.2d at 1342.
355. Id. at 296-97, 691 A.2d at 1342.
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effort to get him help for his drug problem.3 56 Two detectives made
notes of her statements, and she signed both versions.357
By the time of trial, Walker and his girlfriend had married, and
she elected to exercise her privilege to refuse to testify against her
husband.35 The State sought to introduce her statements to the po-
lice.359 These statements were plainly hearsay.36° Moreover, they fell
within no specific exception to the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, the
trial court, after finding her "unavailable," admitted her statements
under the residual exception, along with the police officers' testimony
about those statements.
36 1
Writing for a majority of the court, Judge Wilner reviewed the
development of the residual exception in the Federal and Maryland
Rules, as well as the Maryland cases preceding the adoption of Tide
5,362 He found several requirements that must be met to admit a
hearsay statement under Rule 5-804(b) (5), the residual exception for
unavailable declarants. 363 A number of those requirements were not
disputed in Walker the claim of privilege rendered the witness un-
available, as defined by Rule 5-804(a); the statement was not specifi-
cally covered by any other exception; and appropriate notice was
provided of the State's intention to offer the statement. 364 Nonethe-
less, Judge Wilner found it unnecessary to consider all of the other
requirements to admissibility because he found that the "exceptional
356. Id. at 297, 691 A.2d at 1343.
357. Id., 691 A.2d at 1342.
358. Id., 691 A.2d at 1343.
359. Id.
360. See MD. R. 5-801 (c) (defining "hearsay" as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted").
361. Walker, 345 Md. at 298-99, 691 A.2d at 1343.
362. See id. at 304-18, 691 A.2d at 1346-54.
363. See id. at 318-19, 691 A.2d at 1353-54. Judge Wilner listed six conditions that must
be satisfied to admit a statement under Rule 5-804(b)(5):
(1) the witness must be "unavailable," as defined in [Rule 5-804(a)];
(2) there must be "exceptional circumstances";
(3) the statement must not be specifically covered by any of the other exceptions;
(4) it must have "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness";
(5) the court must determine that (i) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact, (ii) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can produce through rea-
sonable efforts, and (iii) the general purposes of the rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence; and
(6) the proponent of the statement has given the requisite advance notice of its
intention to use the statement.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
364. Id. at 319-20, 691 A.2d at 1354.
364
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circumstances" required by the Rule were lacking.3 65 He concluded,
therefore, that the trial court had erred in admitting the statement.
3 66
Having earlier taken the court to task for failing to be sufficiently
subservient to the federal model and then apparently approving a de-
parture from the federal model designed to make it more difficult to
admit residual hearsay, Judge Chasanow once again faced the oppo-
site direction, dissenting because he thought the court was applying
the residual exception too grudgingly. 6 7 The crux of Judge Chasa-
now's disagreement with the majority concerned the existence vel non
of "exceptional circumstances. 3 6 8  Interestingly, Judge Chasanow
agreed that the fact of the declarant's marriage to the defendant did
not constitute an exceptional circumstance sufficient to satisfy the re-
quirement of the Rule, though for somewhat different reasons from
those articulated by the majority.3 6 9 In finding that the declarant's
marriage to the defendant did not constitute an exceptional circum-
stance, the majority noted the long standing existence of the marital
privilege, indicating that its invocation could hardly be said to be un-
foreseen or exceptional.3  More analytically acute, Judge Chasanow
understood that the marriage simply provided the basis for invocation
of the privilege, making the witness unavailable.3 7' And because the
Rule required unavailability in any event, the fact of the marriage
could not appropriately be considered an exceptional
circumstance.3 7 2
In a careful analysis, Judge Chasanow first recognized the rela-
tionship between the exceptional circumstances requirement and the
requirement that the statement bear circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness:
The exceptional circumstances requirement should not be
read as a bar to all hearsay except hearsay statements made
under bizarre, unique, and never previously contemplated
situations....
. . . When we speak of exceptional circumstances, we
mean exceptional circumstances that justify making the prof-
365. Id. at 330, 691 A.2d at 1359.
366. Id.
367. See generally id. at 334-36, 338-46, 691 A.2d at 1361-62, 1363-67 (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting).
368. See id. at 336, 691 A.2d at 1362.
369. See id. at 342, 691 A.2d at 1365.
370. Walker, 345 Md. at 326-27, 691 A.2d at 1357.
371. See id. at 342, 691 A.2d at 1365 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
372. See id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
fered hearsay an exception to the prohibition against hear-
say, even if it does not fit into the traditional exceptions. 73
He then turned to the facts and found five circumstances that he char-
acterized as making the disputed hearsay statements "exceptional,
trustworthy, and deserving of admission even though they do not fall
within any of the other codified hearsay exceptions. '374 First was the
declarant's motive for making the statement.375 Because the declar-
ant was motivated by her desire to get help for Walker's drug prob-
lem, not by a desire to harm him, Judge Chasanow believed she would
be inspired to tell the truth.376 But this is hardly a sequitur. Presuma-
bly, the declarant would have been motivated to say anything that she
thought might have helped Walker with his drug problem, whether
true or not. Second, Judge Chasanow found that the fact that the
statement was made to the police enhanced its trustworthiness, based
on the reasonable assumption that the police informed her that a
false statement to the police under these circumstances was punisha-
ble by a jail penalty.3 77 It is unclear just how reasonable this assump-
tion is, or even whether, granting its reasonableness, it would have
appreciably affected the declarant's motivation to be truthful.
The last three facts that Judge Chasanow identified have substan-
tially greater force. First, the declarant must have known that her re-
port would have been discredited by the victim were it untrue.3 78
Second, and closely related, the details she recounted were self-verify-
ing.3 79 These were facts reported in extensive detail that could have
been known only to the victim and to the perpetrator, and they were
consistent with the victim's own version of the events.380 Finally,
though the declarant was unavailable to the prosecution-the propo-
nent of the statement-because of her claim of privilege, she was not
unavailable to the defendant. 38 ' Thus, if the defendant wished to im-
peach the out-of-court statement, the declarant could have been
called to contradict or explain it382 -though, of course, this would
373. Id. at 340, 691 A.2d at 1364.
374. Id. at 343, 691 A.2d at 1365; see id. at 343-44, 691 A.2d at 1365-66 (discussing the five
circumstances).
375. Id. at 343, 691 A.2d at 1365.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id., 691 A.2d at 1365-66.
379. Id. at 343-44, 691 A.2d at 1366.
380. See id.
381. Id. at 344, 691 A.2d at 1366.
382. Id.
366 [VOL. 60:315
2001] HowARD CHASANOW AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 367
have subjected her to cross-examination by the prosecution, presuma-
bly an exercise the defendant wished to avoid.
As interesting as Judge Chasanow's careful analysis of the proper
application of the residual exception to the facts are the positions he
staked out that were unnecessary to the case. For example, Judge
Chasanow and the majority disagreed over the limits imposed by the
language of the exception requiring that the proffered statement not
be covered by any of the categorical exceptions. According to the ma-
jority, this language imposes a condition on admissibility;... Judge
Chasanow, however, found it to be merely descriptive.384 It is note-
worthy that this issue was not presented in Walker and that Judge
Chasanow seemed to go out of his way to raise it. The issue becomes
salient primarily in the so-called "near miss" cases. These are cases in
which a particular statement meets almost but not all of the require-
ments of a specific exception to the hearsay rule and the evidence is
offered under the residual exception. Courts that have considered
whether "near miss" cases are admissible have not reached harmoni-
ous conclusions.385
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of the "near miss" is-
sue is in the cases in which the grand jury testimony of an unavailable
witness is admitted under the residual exception despite the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at the time the testimony
was given. Under the rubric of "exceptional circumstances," Chasa-
now urges the admissibility of grand jury testimony of reliable wit-
nesses who have been murdered since their appearances before the
grand jury.386 Now, we are not here talking about witnesses whose
deaths can be tied to the defendant against whom the hearsay is prof-
fered; there are other bases for admissibility in such cases. What we
are considering is whether statements that would fit squarely within
the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule, but for the absence
of the opportunity for cross-examination, may nonetheless be admit-
ted under the residual exception. It is difficult to see how a statement
that fails to meet one or more requirements of a particular exception
designed to assure trustworthiness can nonetheless have equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. It would seem apodicti-
383. See Walker, 345 Md. at 318, 691 A.2d at 1353.
384. Id. at 335, 691 A.2d at 1361 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
385. See Hornstein, supra note 339, at 1074-75 & 1074 n.226 (explaining that federal
courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding the admissibility of "near miss" cases
under the residual exception to the hearsay rule).
386. Cf. FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (6).
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cally to fail the test of trustworthiness (unless there is some other fac-
tor not envisioned by the categorical exception).
IV. CONCLUSION-A MATTER OF DISCRETION
Judge Chasanow's rulings in the six areas discussed above speak
well for his qualities as a judge and his status as a proponent of the
continued development of the law of evidence in Maryland. But there
is one final area of evidence law the consideration of which provides a
fitting conclusion to the discussion of ajudge who is leaving the appel-
late bench to spend at least some time and energy in a return to the
trial court. One of the more difficult issues in Walker involved the
appropriate standard of review of trial court decisions on the admissi-
bility of evidence under the residual hearsay exceptions.3 87 It is a
commonplace that the standard of review of trial court rulings on the
admissibility of evidence is the abuse of discretion standard. 8 A few
years ago, the Supreme Court promised stricter control over the ad-
missibility of untried so-called "scientific" evidence.389 Yet not long
after the more comprehensive test of admissibility was announced, the
Court held that review of trial court determinations of admissibility of
such evidence was to remain under the traditional abuse of discretion
standard. 90 So, abuse of discretion has been firmly entrenched as the
appropriate standard of review of evidentiary rulings. In the main,
such a standard is generally appropriate. The trial judge has a sense
of the context in which evidentiary rulings are made that cannot be
duplicated by an inert record. This "feel" for when a particular piece
of evidence is likely to be more prejudicial than probative, for exam-
ple, gives the trial judge a unique vantage point from which to assess
admissibility.
On the other hand, there are any number of evidentiary issues
that turn less on an assessment of the particular facts than on ques-
387. See Walker, 345 Md. at 332-34, 691 A.2d at 1360-61 (considering the appropriate
standard of review for "exceptional circumstances" cases).
388. See, e.g., 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVI-
DENCE § 102.04[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000) ("The trial judge's broad
discretion in applying the federal rules of evidence suggests that the trial judge's decision
will be final except when clearly amounting to an abuse of discretion.").
389. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993) (applying a
multi-level review of "expert scientific testimony," including: scrutiny of the scientific valid-
ity of the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony, the existence or lack of peer
review and publication of the theory or technique, the known or potential rate of error of a
particular technique, standards governing the technique's operation, and "general accept-
ance" in the scientific community).
390. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 (1997).
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tions of doctrine or policy. For example, in Williams v. State,39' Judge
Chasanow concluded that the trial court erred in restricting the de-
fense's cross-examination of a State expert witness.39 2 At trial, the wit-
ness had testified regarding DNA testing that linked the defendant to
the crime scene, including the procedures for the type of testing used
and the steps taken to ensure that tests were properly performed. 393
During cross-examination, the defense was precluded from question-
ing the witness about the frequency of errors and contamination that
occur during such testing.3 94
Judge Chasanow began his analysis by stating that "[a] s a general
rule, great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of ex-
pert witnesses."395 Further, where DNA evidence is admitted against
an accused in a criminal trial, cross-examination questions should be
allowed regarding how the DNA evidence was obtained, as well as the
lab conditions under which the tests were conducted. 96 Judge Chasa-
now found the necessity for cross-examination regarding errors and
contamination especially pertinent in Williams, based on the type of
DNA testing used: "Possible contamination of samples is a major con-
cern with the reliability of forensic use of PCR testing .... , Judge
Chasanow concluded that the defense's attempt to cast doubt on the
reliability of the testing procedures was a valid way to respond to the
DNA evidence-especially in light of the "well recognized" effects of
contamination on the type of testing used in this case-and that such
cross-examination could have been vital to the jury's weighing of the
DNA test results. 398 Thus, the trial court erred in restricting the de-
fense from engaging in a full cross-examination regarding testing er-
rors and contamination during PCR testing.399
With respect to questions like that presented in Williams, in which
the "feel" for particulars best acquired by participation in the trial it-
self are not especially helpful, the trial court is in no better position to
decide evidentiary questions than the appellate court. Indeed, the
collegial nature of appellate courts suggests that that forum is the su-
391. 342 Md. 724, 679 A.2d 1106 (1996).
392. Id. at 751-52, 679 A.2d at 1120.
393. Id. at 744-46, 679 A.2d at 1116-18.
394. Id. at 748-49, 679 A.2d at 1119.
395. Id. at 749, 679 A.2d at 1119 (citing 3 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 601, at 160 (13th ed. 1973)).
396. Id. (citing United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 563 (6th Cir. 1993); State v.
Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 512 (Wash. 1993)).
397. Id. (citing William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight
of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REv. 45, 77-78 (1989)).
398. Id. at 751, 679 A.2d at 1120.
399. Id. at 751-52, 679 A.2d at 1120.
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perior decisionmaker on such issues. Most courts, however, fail to rec-
ognize such a distinction, applying the abuse of discretion standard
willy-nilly to all evidentiary issues. Perhaps they do so to avoid rever-
sals and retrials. As most of us would admit were we entirely candid, it
is virtually impossible to run an entirely error-free trial of any com-
plexity. The objections and rulings simply come too thick and fast for
serious deliberation, and shooting from the hip, no matter how gener-
ally well-informed the shooter, is not a recipe for an error-free record.
Yet many of these rulings are close calls about which reasonable
judges could disagree, and de novo review of such rulings is likely to
fail any reasonable cost-benefit analysis-at least with respect to a par-
ticular case.
Viewed systemically, however, the abuse of discretion standard
may fail to provide sufficient appellate control of evidentiary doctrine
and policy. The Court of Appeals recognized this in Walker, and
sought to control trial court discretion in two ways. First, Judge Wil-
ner indicated that the abuse of discretion standard would not permit
coherent development of new hearsay exceptions.4 °° Inconsistent
trial court decisions might well survive review under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. 40 1 The court wished to maintain tight control over
the development of the law in this area-a goal not easily achievable if
review was limited to abuse of discretion. 40 2 Second, the court de-
manded explicit separate findings on each of the prerequisites to ad-
missibility under the residual exception.40 3 Unfortunately, the court
did not go so far as to demand an account of how the trial court ar-
rived at these findings.40 4 Thus, Walker suggests that a mere con-
clusory recitation of findings would be sufficient. Although it is
difficult to reconcile the need for trial court specificity, to allow mean-
ingful appellate review, and the needs of the trial courts to simply get
on with it, the Court of Appeals's compromise is not a happy one. It
effectively returns us to a masked abuse of discretion standard.
400. State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 325, 691 A.2d 1341, 1356 (1997). As Judge Wilner
concluded:
Some of the subsidiary determinations made by a trial court in arriving at its find-
ings and conclusions may well be purely factual or discretionary ones, and, as to
them, we will continue to apply a clearly erroneous or abuse of discretion stan-
dard. As to the conclusion [whether to admit evidence under the residual excep-
tions], however, we shall apply a de novo standard of review.
Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 321-22, 691 A.2d at 1355.
404. Id. at 324, 691 A.2d at 1356 (noting that it would be "helpful" to know what factors
the trial court considered, but failing to require such an explanation).
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Judge Chasanow's approach was a bit more nuanced, suggesting
which aspects of the trial court's determination should be subject to
de novo review and which to an abuse of discretion standard. His
conclusion is worth quoting:
The preliminary fact findings made by the trial judge, in
resolving whether residual exception hearsay is admissi-
ble . .. should be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. On the
other hand, any decision to admit residual exception hearsay
involves some weighing and determinations that, in effect,
create new hearsay exceptions by serving as precedent.., for
admitting hearsay not within the traditional exceptions.
These policy aspects of the decision to admit residual excep-
tion hearsay deserve heightened appellate scrutiny.40 5
Unfortunately, Judge Chasanow failed to address directly the ex-
tent to which the trial judge should be required to make explicit find-
ings on the record that the conditions necessary for the admission of
residual hearsay are met, and, as important, to provide the basis for
those findings. Indeed, Judge Chasanow has been less than consistent
on this matter. He has, for example, insisted that the trial court state
its reasons for admitting challenged evidence of other crimes or bad
acts.4" 6 Yet he has also been as lenient as the Supreme Court on the
standard of review governing the admissibility of expert testimony.40 7
In other instances, Judge Chasanow has staked out a middle ground,
finding discretion in the trial court, but articulating specific factors to
guide the exercise of that discretion.40 8
These matters of the trial judge's discretion are likely to grow in-
creasingly salient for Judge Chasanow; for after leaving the Court of
Appeals he sometimes returns to his true legal love, sitting as a trial
judge, where, once again, he has the opportunity to exercise his
knowledge and understanding of the law of evidence and its princi-
ples and policies. There is little to fear from an expansive view of the
trial court's discretion when judges like Howard Chasanow are on the
405. Id. at 333, 691 A.2d at 1360 (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
406. See Streater v. State, 352 Md. 800, 821, 724 A.2d 111, 121 (1999) (holding that
reversible error occurs where significant evidence of other crimes was admitted without
any apparent on-the-record consideration by the trial court").
407. See Franch v. Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 364, 670 A.2d 951, 957 (1996) ("A trial judge's
decision to admit or exclude expert testimony will be reversed only if it is founded on an
error of law or some serious mistake, or if the judge has abused his discretion." (citing
Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 576, 611 A.2d 581, 590 (1992))).
408. See Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 92-93, 629 A.2d 1239, 1246-47 (1993) (reversing the
trial judge on his application of the curative admissibility doctrine and identifying two
factors that would have made the court "far less willing" to reach its decision had the trial
judge taken notice of them).
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trial bench. The citizens of Maryland, and especially the trial bar,
should welcome the return of this barrister's judge to his natural
habitat.
